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The Silences of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only
Adversary Practice
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees,
and expenses, and waste of time. As a peace-maker the lawyer has a superior
opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business enough.'
- Abraham Lincoln, 1850
This Restatement ... aims to restate the law. It reflects decisional law and
statutes and takes account of the lawyer codes in its formulations .... Because
this is a Restatement of the law, the black letter and commentary do not discuss
other important subjects, such as considerations of sound professional practice
or personal or professional morality or ethics.
2
- Reporter's Memorandum, March 29, 1996
Proposed Final Draft No. 1
I know that mediation requires some formal rules but I hope they are few. Too
many and we will lose the essence. 3
- Letter from Jacob A. Stein, Esq.
April 29, 1997
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Chair, Center for Public Resources Institute for
Dispute Resolution-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in Alternative Dispute Resolution
[hereinafter CPR-Georgetown Commission]; Member, Members Consultative Group, American Law Institute,
Restatement on the Law Governing Lawyers.
I thank Elena Ro for excellent research assistance; Elizabeth Plapinger, Vice President of the CPR Institute
for Dispute Resolution and the Conflicts Drafting Sub-Committee of the Working Group on Mediation as the
Practice of Law of the CPR-Georgetown Commission for consultation, ideas, and hard work; the editors of The
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics for hosting the Symposium; and the Reporters of the Restatement and
Geoffrey Hazard, Director of the American Law Institute (ALI), for their devoted labors over the years to the
larger effort of the Restatement and for their willingness to listen to me.
1. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture (1850), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINcoLN: SUPPLEMENT 1832-1865, 18, 19 (Roy P. Basler, ed. 1974). This fragment was re-edited from the
original manuscript, which began with "Never encourage" rather than "Discourage."
2. RESTATEMENT (TreaD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS Reporter's Memorandum (Am. Law Inst.
Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFT I ].
3. Letter from Jacob A. Stein, Esq., Partner, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Washington, D.C., to Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Apr. 29, 1997) (on file with the
author).
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE
The attempt to "restate" the law governing lawyers is a noble effort. The
drafts, to date, have presented a heroic gathering, in one place, of case law and
competing formulations of a variety of the professional disciplinary codes. The
drafters have attempted to settle some difficult and often contentious issues
regarding lawyer responsibilities to clients, to courts, to third parties, and to
themselves.4 At the same time, this Restatement suffers from the temporal flaws
of all its sisters and brothers - in its efforts to "restate ' 5 the law it looks
backward, not forward, and thus will provide little guidance, at least on some
important issues, for the practicing lawyer, judge, or disciplinary committee of
the twenty-first century.
The silences, by which I mean absences, of the Restatement are comprised of a
growing diversity of lawyer, third party neutral, and judge-like roles that are
simply not dealt with in the Restatement. If Abraham Lincoln could see the value
in preventing and discouraging litigation where possible, then it seems important
for any statement of the law governing lawyers to deal with the increasing array
of issues confronting the lawyer in these new roles. The sounds of silence on
these issues are deafening to me as I grapple with ethical and regulatory issues
related to conflicts of interest, confidentiality, multi-disciplinary practice, fees,
disclosure obligations, consent, accountability, third-party liability, and a whole
host of issues that now confront the newer practices of law encompassed under
the broad umbrella of Alternative, or as we now prefer, "Appropriate," Dispute
Resolution (ADR).6 I know my colleagues who care about legal ethics will say
that there are a few silences for them. Through correspondence with all of the
4. As Professor Nancy Moore points out in this issue, the Restatement has several purposes. In addition to
"clarify[ing] the law and... provid[ing] a text that courts and other legal bodies deciding contested cases can
employ ... as a general statement of relevant legal doctrine," Nancy Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer
Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 541 (1997), the Restatement is intended to "serve as an educational and
reference tool" for lawyers, judges, law students, and others who need to understand the legal duties,
obligations, and other requirements that are imposed on those who practice law, including disciplinary, civil,
and, in some cases, criminal liabilities that may flow from professional activity. Id.
5. Others have argued that restatements have never really simply restated the law. Every restatement has
"resolved" controversial issues, sometimes by accepting the majority view, other times by preferring a minority
view that the elite group of lawyers, judges, and academics who comprise the ALl find better suited to their own
deliberations or political processes. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA 's Model Rules:
Rivals or Complements, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1993) (expressing concern that the ALl, in its efforts to
restate the law of lawyering, may yield to narrow interests in the profession and stands to undermine the
American Bar Association's (ABA) role as "lawgiver for the practice of law" due to both overlapping and
differing treatments of some ethical issues).
6. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers From the
Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1997) (focusing on
dilemma of developing standards or rules of ethics specifically related and responsive to ADR practices,
because ADR employs a "different set of underlying values than informs traditional adversary ethics"). The
Restatement is silent on a variety of other issues that have been proposed to the Reporters for coverage: the
ethical duties of lawyers in class actions and in bankruptcy and similarly contextually specific settings where
traditional models of representation may not be adequate.
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Reporters, I have continually expressed my concerns about the absence of issues
relevant to the different, less adversarial practice of some forms of ADR. Most
have responded that the current rules and the Restatement will answer the
complicated questions about conflicts of interest, 7 fees, disclosures, liability, and
confidentiality, and that the Judicial Code of Conduct will serve as a useful
reference for issues relevant to third-party neutrals, such as arbitrators and
mediators. An alternative response has been that when lawyers act as mediators
8
they are not representing clients, 9 and thus their activity is beyond the scope of
the Restatement. 10
Although the Restatement does, on occasion, acknowledge the existence of
7. For example, to the extent that Restatement section 201 ("Basic Prohibition of Conflict of Interest")
provides that "all affected clients and other necessary persons" consent (to "consentable" conflicts) and that a
conflict of interest is presented if "there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of a client would be
materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's.., duties to... a third person," RESTATEMENT DRAFT 1 § 206
(including here possible "non-clients"), such as parties to a mediation, it can be argued that lawyers' duties to
non-client parties to a mediation may be included within the rubric of the lawyers' representational conflict of
interest rules. The current rules do not make this clear and do not seem to intend to include lawyers' possible
conflicts of interests that can occur when lawyers serve as mediators, as well as representational lawyers or
when, even if they are solely mediators, their partners may take on representational duties that may be in conflict
with mediation or arbitration relationships of other partners. Thus, despite the arguable applicability by text, or
by analogy, of some of the Restatement sections, I still think the Restatement is largely silent on the issues
affecting lawyers acting as third-party neutrals who are not representational or adversarial lawyers.
8. In an unpublished ruling, Steinberg v. Commonwealth, No. CL96000504-00 (Cir. Ct. Henrico County, Va.
Sept. 17, 1996), a court in Virginia held that mediators were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when
they informed parties that they would serve as "legal counselor[s] and mediator[s]" and would advise the
parties as to their "rights and obligations under the law." See Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LImG., July/Aug. 1997, at 94 (reporting on the
significance of the Steinberg opinion in light of the fact that mediator certification requirements in Virginia do
not require that mediators be licensed attorneys).
9. Over the years there has been some confusion about the applicability of Model Rule 2.2 to mediation. I
read that section, especially the comment, to suggest that "intermediation" contemplates a lawyer who
represents two clients (such as in joint ventures, purchases, partnerships) and that the section does not apply to
mediation where the mediator has no representational relationship to the participants in the mediation. In fact,
Model Rule 2.2 "does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator or mediator between or among parties who are
not clients of the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties." MODEL
RuLES Rule 2.2 cmt. 2. The Restatement adopts this position. Letter from John Leubsdorf, Professor of Law, The
State University of New Jersey, Rutgers University, School of Law-Newark, S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and
Justice, to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (July 7, 1996) (on file
with The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics) [hereinafter Letter from John Leubsdorf, July 7, 1996] (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 153 (Am. Law Inst. Tent. Draft No. 8, 1997)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFT 8]).
10. See, e.g., Letter from Charles W. Wolfram, Charles Frank Reavis, Sr. Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School, to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (July 3, 1996)
(stating that "the specific substantive content" of regulations regarding lawyers performing functions other than
the representation of clients is "a matter clearly beyond the scope of the Restatement") (on file with The
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics); Letter from Thomas D. Morgan, Oppenheim Professor of Law, The
George Washington University Law School, to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center (July 1, 1996) (on file with the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics) (stating belief that
ADR should be acknowledged as "sui generis" and offering analogies between issues related to ADR and those
the Restatement actually does address).
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ADR, it is mostly in reference to protecting lawyers' own interests, n such as
recognition of arbitration for fee disputes and malpractice claims or preservation
of the more adversarial qualities of ADR by extending work product protection to
materials prepared for ADR proceedings. It does not, however, deal with some of
the more reform-oriented issues of ADR - less adversarial behavior required of
lawyers within some kinds of ADR proceedings,' 2 duties and obligations of
third-party neutrals to the parties before them in a dispute,' 3 and duties and
obligations to subsequent parties or clients. Thus, while the Restatement is a
noble effort to restate the law, in its present form it will provide continued grist
for the mill of those who argue that lawyers' ethics codes are a self-serving'
4
attempt to preserve the status quo' 5 by acknowledging ADR only when it
11. Critics of ADR suggest that ADR often is chosen by the more powerful party to a contractual relationship
in order to establish control over the choice of forum, the decision-making party, and the procedural timing, as
well as to provide for a more private, secret form of dispute resolution. See, e.g., The Downside of ADR,
CCM-THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CORPORATE COUNSEL MAGAZINE, Apr. 1997, at 43 (discussing, between
on-line participants, corporate advantages realized through ADR, including the deterrence of litigated lawsuits
and the institutionalization of privatized justice). Control over these factors sometimes is sought by lawyers who
seek to protect themselves and their reputations when engaged in disputes with their own clients. See Stephen
Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Fails
to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee Agreements With Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581 (1997)
(arguing that the Restatement leaves unsophisticated consumers of legal services inadequately protected
because the duties it imposes on lawyers regarding fee arrangements are framed in the language of uncertain
standards, such as the concept of "reasonable" fees).
12. Less adversarial aspects of ADR include disclosure of more sensitive settlement facts, needs, or interests
than would otherwise be disclosed in discovery or litigation, a more problem-solving approach to participation
in mediation, a greater degree of candor, and a greater degree of participation by the parties in settlement and
mediation activities. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation?, DisP. RESOL. MAG. (forthcoming
Winter 1998) (manuscript on file with the author). For more focused discussion of these and additional relevant
factors, see, for example, JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 4-6 (1996) (stating that mediators
simultaneously employ intuition, instinct, interpersonal communication skills, and the ability to apply logical,
rational thinking to situations to encourage flexibility among the parties and to reach creative, amenable
solutions that generate less expense but significant compliance); DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES
§ 3.4 (1996) (stressing that mediators should establish a rapport between themselves and the disputant parties in
an informal yet controlled context in which psychological barriers can be identified and responsive strategies
implemented to discharge the potential for settlement impasse).
13. Such duties and responsibilities are spelled out in a variety of other professional codes that the
Restatement does not address, such as the CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, 1977) [hereinafter ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DisPUTs], the COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 1993), the COMMERCIAL MEDIATION RULES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 1990), and
the JOINT STANDARDS OF CONDUCr FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Bar Ass'n, Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Society of Prof'l
Mediators, 1994) [hereinafter JOINT STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS]. Many states have passed statutory schemes
that regulate and provide for ethical duties and responsibilities for lawyer mediators. E.g., FLA. ST. MEDIATOR R.
10.090; MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. Rule. 114.
14. See Richard Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639, 643-44 (1981)
(arguing that the Model Rules are not likely to promote ethical behavior because, while they may hold lawyers
to selfless standards, they are advanced by particular segments of the bar who seek to maximize their own, as
well as their clients', self-interests.
15. See, e.g., Jerold Auerbach, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 302
(1976) (describing the history of the promulgation of ethical rules, reflecting the financial, sociological, and
professional biases of lawyers seeking to preserve their positions and arguing that "[a]s long. .. as lawyers [are]
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facilitates lawyers' conventional interests as adversarial advocates or as parties to
disputes with their own clients, rather than as potential third-party neutrals,
whether as problem-solving facilitators or as more conventional decision mak-
16
ers.
In the move from the Model Code of Professional Responsibility17 to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,18 the Kutak Commission admirably
recognized a greater variety of lawyer roles than just the assumed model of the
litigator and the criminal defense lawyer. The Model Rules recognize such lawyer
roles as counselor, advisor,19 intermediary, 20 government official,
21 prosecutor,2 2
former judge, arbitrator,23 representative of entities, 24 as well as individuals, and
as evaluators (with potential liability to third parties who rely on such lawyers'
work or representations).25 At the same time, the Kutak Commission rejected the
separate treatment of certain other lawyer roles; there were efforts to require
candor and fair agreements from negotiators26 and drafters, 27 to institute manda-
tory pro bono requirements,28 and to formulate separate rules for some kinds of
public interest lawyers.29
During this time, the Model Rules began to recognize the increasing diversity,
permitted to monopolize solutions to problems that their monopoly of solutions [has] created, the problems
[will] endure"); Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (historically analyzing the process by which the Model
Rules were developed, noting that many of the problems impeding this process were due to the heterogeneity of
those who comprise the legal profession).
16. ADR has had its share of typologies and classifications, but one that might be quite useful here is the
distinction now made between decision-seeking forms of ADR that look more like adjudication (such as
arbitration) with more conventional adversary roles and settlement-seeking forms of ADR that may use different
problem-solving or facilitative techniques (such as mediation and early neutral evaluation). See Jeffrey Stempel,
Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture or
Fledgling Adulthood, 11 Omo ST. J. DisP. REsOL. 297, 340-44 (1996) (characterizing ADR methods as a
continuum ranging from those that facilitate settlement to those that act as surrogates for adjudication).
17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
19. Id. Rule 2.1.
20. Id. Rule 2.2.
21. Id. Rule 1.11.
22. Id. Rule 3.8.
23. Id. Rule 1.12.
24. Id. Rule 1.13.
25. Id. Rule 2.3.
26. See J.J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 926 (addressing the impact of the Model Rules on a lawyer's honesty when participating in
negotiations and arguing against heightened special rules for ethics in negotiation, such as later rejected
proposed Model Rules 4.2 and 4.3).
27. See William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System: A Model Rule That Should
Have Been, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 799 (1993) (advocating that the Model Rules should prohibit lawyers
from "drafting an agreement that contained 'legally prohibited terms' or that 'would be held to be unconscio-
nable as a matter of law' ") (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 (Discussion Draft, 1980)
[hereinafter 1980 MODEL RULES DRAFTI).
28. 1980 MODEL RULES DRAFT Rule 8.1.
29. Id. Rules 8.1, 8.2.
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specialization, and complexity of the legal profession,30 while at the same time
trying to hold to the notion of a unified profession that could be regulated by one
set of rules in spite of potentially different loyalties or claims of role.31 In my
view, shared by others,32 the Model Rules began a project to recognize the role
diversity of lawyers, and the time has come to fully acknowledge that differentia-
tion of roles. The practice of law includes a wide array of complex responsibili-
ties, duties, obligations, and liabilities, and as some have claimed,33 the different
nature of these activities should be addressed in our ethical codes.
To the extent that the Restatement "restates" the law, it goes no further than the
Model Rules in recognizing some of these new or differentiated roles.3 4 The
question, as I see it, is whether the Restatement, in its goal to "restate" the law
governing lawyers, can or should be responsive to some of the changing roles of
lawyers.
30. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics,
Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 621 (1994) (outlining innovations in
law practice resulting from the diversification of the legal profession); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the
Gap By Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a
Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REv. 593, 608 (1994) (criticizing the MacCrate Report for failing to take account of
"the complexity of differing theories about both law and lawyering").
31. As someone with sociological training, the attempt to define and differentiate different lawyer roles and,
at the same time, cabin them as a unified role of lawyer in the ethics codes always has seemed somewhat
problematic and ironic to me. Sociologists of professional work long have been students of this phenomenon.
See, e.g., RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) (tracing historical factors that have made it difficult for
American lawyers to speak with a single voice); ELIOT FRLEDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986) (demonstrating the difficulty in delineating professional
groups by attributes, traits, or defining characteristics); Andrew Abbott, Professional Ethics, 88 AM. J.
SOCIOLOGY 855 (1981) (comparing professional ethics codes from functionalist, monopolist, intra-professional,
and extra-professional perspectives); Andrew Abbott, Jurisdictional Conflicts: A New Approach to the
Development of the Legal Profession, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 187 (1986) (outlining conflicts of roles within the
American and English legal professions).
32. Currently proposed changes to the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) recog-
nize the new roles of lawyers as mediators and arbitrators by including subjects for testing such as conflicts of
interests in mediation, arbitration, and judicial proceedings, so that the MPRE no longer merely tests solely on
the Model Rules. Letter from Erica Moeser, National Conference of Bar Examiners, to law school deans (Feb.
28, 1997) (on file with the National Conference of Bar Examiners). In addition, the authoritative Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Annotated (1996), prepared by the American Bar Association's Center for Professional
Responsibility, reports on recent cases involving these new roles as they may affect interpretations of the current
Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED Rules 1.9, 1.12 commentary at 148,
195-96, 198 [hereinafter MODEL RULES ANN.] (discussing the holdings of Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880
F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995) and Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995) on Model Rules
1.9 and 1.12). But see GEOFFREY HAZARD AND WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 2:101, at 497 (Supp. 1986) (suggesting that mediators are governed
by Model Rule 2.2 (Intermediary) and therefore represent all parties).
33. In Los Angeles, entertainment lawyers plead (formally in court and elsewhere) that they cannot be held to
the same standards of conflicts of interests, as they are "lawyers for the deal." Corie Brown, That's
Entertainment, CAL. LAWYER, June 1993, at 38; Alan Citron & Robert W. Welkos, The "Pope of Hollywood"-
Ziffren 's Representation of Studios, Stars is Challenged, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 23, 1992, at D- 1.
34. However the Model Rules recently have recognized some new complexities of practice, such as in Model
Rule 5.7, adopted in 1994, which governs ancillary "law-related services."
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In this paper, I will focus principally on the new or more varied roles produced
by the increase of what I call ADR or "less adversarial" practice, although there
are other examples of these varied roles.35 Even though the Reporters may claim
these roles are beyond the scope of the Restatement, I offer the fact that there have
been a number of cases in recent years that have had to confront such issues as:
when mediators become advocates, and conflicts of interest and disqualification
motions arise; 36 when former judges mediate and then join the law firms of
parties previously before them;37 or when arbitrators learn that their former law
firm represented one of the parties before the arbitration.38 Similarly, issues of
mediator liability to third parties - i.e., participants in a mediation - for advice
given in non-privity or non-representational settings, confidentiality obligations,
and breaches are likely to become of increasing relevance as mediation and other
forms of ADR grow in both the private contractual settings 39 and in the public,
court-annexed context.4 °
While analogies to current Model Code, Model Rule, and Restatement sections
may work in some cases and were effectively employed in the cases cited thus
far, common ADR practices probably will not be adequately dealt with by the
35. The highly contested debate about the obligations of insurance defense counsel has been complicated in
part by concerns that special rules for insurance lawyers might affect other "third-party lawyers," such as legal
services lawyers, or other third-party payers for legal services. Moore, supra note 4, at 550 & n. 69-70. Thus,
formulating special regulations for specialized lawyers may be preferable to attempting to apply broader
principles for all lawyers that may have disparate effects on different kinds of lawyers.
36. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995) (holding that a mediator
who obtained confidential information in the course of mediation was precluded from later representing anyone
in connection with the "same or substantially factually related matter" unless all parties to the mediation
consented after disclosure). In the criminal context, see State v. Tolias, 929 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997) (reversing criminal conviction where prosecutor previously served as mediator in dispute between
defendant and victim, thus creating an "appearance of unfairness").
37. See Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995) (disqualifying law firm as counsel in
lawsuit after it hired the retired judge who had presided over the action and who had received ex parte
confidences from the opposing party in the course of settlement conferences).
38. See Al-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the fact that an arbitrator does not
conduct an investigation sufficient to uncover the existence of the facts of a firm's prior representation of a party
is not sufficient to vacate an arbitration award for evident partiality).
39. See, e.g., Loretta W. Moore, Lawyer Mediators: Meeting the Ethical Challenges, 30 FAM. L.Q. 679, 700
(1996) (citing case in which arbitrator was sued by one party for failing to disclose prior relationship with other
party).
40. The question of whether different ethics or standards should govern private contractual and court ordered
ADR is itself a very difficult question, implicating both ethical and substantive issues. See, e.g., Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 331 (noting that the Supreme
Court has both enforced arbitration clauses that weaken national law regulating commerce and, through its
decisions regarding arbitration, federalized the regulation of commercial and employment transactions,
ordinarily a subject of state law); Jeffrey Stempel, supra note 16, at 347 (acknowledging the debate concerning
the relationship between public and private sector ADR, yet arguing that a stable national ADR policy must be
developed through lengthy and forthright discussions); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for its overzealous preference for binding arbitration over litigation in commercial settings).
41. Al-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487
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current rule configurations. As a result, the Reporters have the choice of either
specifying and clarifying where current law will help aid in resolving these issues
and where new rules might be necessary, or ignoring these issues and waiting to
restate them in the Law Governing Lawyers Fourth.42 At the very least, it seems
the Restatement should acknowledge what is already widespread practice -
lawyers are serving as third-party neutrals and rules contemplating representa-
tional practices do not provide adequate guidance for these activities. When
lawyers act as third-party neutrals, they are still lawyers. If the Restatement is
truly a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, then it should include the law
that does and should cover these lawyers.
In this paper I will briefly canvass what, if anything, the Restatement has done
with respect to these issues. I will explore the differences of lawyer roles and why
a conventional adversarial representational model will not work to deal with
issues of ADR practice. Finally, I will conclude by offering a proposed rule and
sections of the Restatement that will give some guidance to these practices where
now there is silence.43
II. THE RESTATEMENT and Dispute Resolution: Lawyers Principally
As Advocates
Like other codifications of rules governing lawyers, the Restatement sees
lawyers as representatives of clients, usually in one of two roles - as an
advocate 44 or as an advisor-counselor.45 Also, the Restatement does recognize
other lawyer roles - as "representative," including potential lobbyist, before a
legislative or administrative body, 46 as evaluator for third persons, 47 and in the
(D. Utah 1995); Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Tolias, 929 P.2d 1178, 1181
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
42. The CPR-Georgetown Commission's Working Group on The Practice of Law currently is trying its
collective drafting hand (as others have before it) on composing a rule for lawyers as third-party neutrals. This
rule will attempt to specify some of the conflicting and different duties and obligations of lawyers who act as
non-adversarial facilitators of dispute resolution. In my view, another set of standards of rules may be needed for
advocates or representatives who act within certain ADR proceedings, such as mediation or early neutral
evaluation where different duties of candor, cooperation, or problem solving may be necessary.
43. I am, at the same time, mindful of the admonition indicated at the beginning of this Article, that the field
of mediation is both relatively new and dependent on flexibility for its success. Too much rule-making and too
many standards may limit its very advantages over the litigation process. Many feel this has already happened
with arbitration, where high costs and long time delays may make arbitration more expensive and more costly
than litigation. See Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 621, 629 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting
that in Oakland, California, the average time for arbitration of medical malpractice cases is over 800 days
whereas the average time for litigation of such cases is just over 400 days), rev'd, on other grounds, 938 P.2d
903 (Cal. 1997).
44. RESTATEMENT DRAFtr 8 Ch. 7.
45. Id. Ch. 6.
46. Id. § 164.
47. Id. § 152.
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specialized role of government lawyer.48 However, totally missing from the
Restatement is any definition or conception of the many new roles that lawyers
serve in dispute resolution - arbitrators, 49 mediators,5 ° early neutral evalua-
51tors, or most controversially, representatives or advocates within new formats
of dispute resolution.52
I will briefly review the Restatement's treatment of sections that would
logically be related to lawyers' different roles in ADR. In my view, the drafters of
the Restatement should redraft existing rules, including comments and reporter's
notes, to recognize the ethical duties, responsibilities, and obligations that are
implicated in these new roles. They also should make some reference in
comments and notes where analogies to advocacy rules may have applicability to
ethical concerns in ADR. Alternatively, as I will illustrate in Section III, the
drafters could create a separate topic or set of rules to consider some of the ethical
concerns of "The Lawyer As Neutral." Without adopting the changes advocated
above, the silences of the Restatement will remain deafening.
A. EXAMPLES OF THE SILENCES
1. Candor to Which Tribunal?
In many of the existing sections of the Restatement that relate to these new
roles, no mention is made of the possible analogies or issues that might apply to
such roles. For example, when the lawyer has a duty to disclose legal authority to
a tribunal,53 there is no consideration of whether an early neutral evaluation or
48. Id. § 156.
49. Arguably, arbitrators closely resemble judicial officers and therefore may be covered by the Judicial
Code of Conduct or specialized rules of arbitration fora such as the Code of Ethics of the AAA for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes or the National Academy of Arbitrators Code of Professional Responsibility. See
generally, e.g., IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW (1991) (tracing the historical development of
federal arbitration law); IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBrrRATION Acr (1994) (presenting an overview of the current status of federal
arbitration law); George Nicolau, The National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) at 50, Disp. RESOL. J., Spring
1997, at 61 (celebrating the 50th anniversary of the NAA, a professional organization whose goal is to further
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution in industrial disputes).
50. Attempts to specify ethical standards of conduct for mediators may be found in the ETmCAL STANDARDS
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIlLITY (Soc'y of Prof'ls in Dispute Resolution, 1986); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (Academy of Family Mediators); RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR MEDIATION /
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (J.A.M.S.-Endispute), available at <http://www.jams-endispute.
com/arbitrationrules/medemprules.html>.
51. See Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46
STAN. L. REv. 1487 (1994) (setting forth the findings and recommendations of the authors, who were advisors to
a task force conducting a study of the early neutral evaluation (ENE) program in the Northern District of
California).
52. As I have discussed elsewhere, there is a serious question about whether lawyer duties or behavior should
be different in less adversarial, more problem-solving fora. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Post-Modern Multi-cultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6 (1996).
53. RESTATEmENT DRAFT8 § 171.
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mediation session conducted under the auspices of a court - whether in the
courthouse or in a private office - would constitute a tribunal for purposes of
section 171 of the Restatement.
54
2. Conflicts of Interest
The majority of conflict of interest rules found in Chapter Eight of the current
draft fail to address a wide variety of conflicts that occur every day, especially
conflicts that occur when lawyers, either individually, or in the context of law
firms, mix practices. Thus, as I have written at greater length elsewhere,55 there
may be a unique breed of conflicts when lawyers serve as mediators, arbitrators,
and advocates over time, or when they share such functions with their partners.56
Conflicts may exist when mediators, who have facilitated solutions at arms-
length and have learned confidential and proprietary information about the
disputing parties,5 7 discover that a party to a previous mediation is seeking
representation from the mediator or arbitrator's law firm. Does this give the
appearance of having "earned" the representation by facilitating a favorable
settlement?58 An even worse scenario presents itself if one of the parties to a
mediation asks the law firm whose member acted as a neutral to sue a former
party to a mediation. In such situations, questions arise as to whether a mediator
who learned damaging facts during a mediation would or could use those facts
against the now adverse party, or whether a mediator can mediate a case
involving former clients of the firm in a related matter or in a non-related matter.
Thus, conflicts may occur because the roles of a lawyer can change from
third-party neutral to advocate or vice versa and because there are different
considerations depending on the order of the relations from adjudicative distance
or settlement "intimacy" to advocacy and representation. The courts in Poly
Software International v. Yu Su59 and Cho v. Superior Court6° were able to
54. This same ambiguity exists with respect to what a tribunal is under Model Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the
Tribunal). The Restatement includes arbitration and other contested hearings as tribunals, but it excludes
mediation. RESTATEMENT DRAFT 8 Ch.7, Introductory Note.
55. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ancillary Practice and Conflicts of Interest: When Lawyer Ethics
Rules Are Not Enough, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LrG., Feb. 1995, at 15 (questioning whether the
standard conflict of interests rules of legal representation can be applied to lawyers who act as third-party
neutrals while working in a conventional law firm) [hereinafter Ancillary Practice]; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 6, at 453 (calling for standards for ADR lawyers that are not based in an adversarial conception of law).
56. See Elizabeth Plapinger, CPR-Georgetown Commission, Draft White Paper on Conflicts of Interest
Rules for Lawyer Mediators and Their Institutions (Preliminary Draft, 1996, on file with the author) (assessing
current approaches to regulating conflicts of interest among members of law firms who act as third-party neutral
mediators).
57. Such confidential information may include trade secrets, financial conditions, or personnel matters.
58. See Larry Fox, What if the Rules are Different? 26-27 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author) (claiming that a mediator's ethical duties are more akin to those of a judge than to those of a lawyer
because a mediator must not merely "do right," he must also make it look as if he is doing right).
59. 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-95 (D. Utah 1995).
60. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 868-70 (Ct. App. 1995).
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analogize conflict situations from Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9 by treating former
mediations as if they were "substantially related" prior representations and
rejecting the "screening" asked for by reference to Model Rule 1.12. Nevertheless, I
believe the current rules and Restatement sections will not solve all of these problems.
The cases that have already been decided provide illustrations of the difficul-
ties of these issues. First, in Cho, a former judge who had used mediation
techniques, such as meeting privately with the parties and learning about their
"real" interests and confidential information, later joined a law firm that
represented one of the parties.6 t The firm sought to utilize Model Rule 1.12,
suggesting that the judge could be screened from his new partners.62 However,
the court appropriately rejected this approach, suggesting that even if the judge
effectively could be prevented from sharing any damaging information he may
have obtained, the very appearance of a neutral joining "the fray" undermined
the appearance of propriety so vital to our legal system.6 3
Note that a number of important values, played out differently in this new
context, are at issue. Some have argued that mediators are appropriate candidates
for screening precisely because they promise complete confidentiality to the
parties when they mediate or conduct settlement conferences. 64 Yet, mediators
and settlement judges learn particularly significant facts, what I will call "settle-
ment facts,",65 that go beyond what a judge sitting at an arms-length and
decisional distance from the parties may learn.66 When trying to facilitate a
solution and learn what is really going on with the parties, third-party neutrals
learn entity or individual proprietary information that could go beyond the legal
relevance of the facts of a particular case. This information could turn out to be
quite significant later on in any adverse representation against a former party to a
settlement proceeding. Thus, with the general danger of leakages from screens,67
the fact that information may be used in a damaging way, even in a "substantially
61. Id. at 863-65.
62. Id. at 864.
63. Id. at 870. At the symposium, Professor Geoffrey Hazard commented that he did not want to return to the
ambiguous and "garbage" term of "appearance of impropriety," a term that was used in the Model Code to deal
with some of these conflicts issues. Pros and Cons of RestatementAre Debated at D.C. Conference, [13 Current
Reports] LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CoNDuCr (ABA/BNA) 29, 31-32 (Feb. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Pros and Cons]. He
did suggest, however, that the kind of loyalty expected by and of CEOs of corporations might be useful here (not
joining the competition, for example).
64. James Maguire, Conflicts in Subsequent Representation, DisPuTE RESOLuTION MAGAZINE, Spring 1996,
at 4.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 110-11 for a definition of this term.
66. Yet some judges, like the one in Cho, can learn such confidential "settlement facts" (like the financial
status or needs of the parties, business considerations, trade secrets, privacy concerns, etc.) in settlement
conferences, especially when mediation-like "caucus" sessions are held in such settings. See Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, For andAgainst Settlement: The Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA
L. REv. 485, 503-04 (1985) (describing the empirical practices of judges in settlement conferences).
67. See AL Nears Finish Line on Lawyer Ethics, Product Liability Projects, 64 U.S. L. WK. 2739, 2740
(1996) (paraphrasing remarks of Larry Fox, Esq., who claimed that "inadvertent disclosure in larger firms is a
significant problem when the number of screens begins to mount up").
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unrelated matter," requires a particular attention to conflicts issues that goes
beyond the analysis of former or concurrent representational relationships.68
While it is true that lawyers, through representation roles, also learn propri-
etary confidential information about clients that could be damaging to the client if
the lawyer or the lawyer's firm were subsequently allowed to be adverse to that
client, current rules that deal with such situations do so only in representational
capacities. 69 Under these rules, unless other rules require or permit it,70 a lawyer
may not use information acquired in a prior representation against that party in a
subsequent adverse representation.71
There are several solutions to the lack of rules for mediators and third-party
neutrals with respect to conflicts of interest. As the court did in Poly Software,7 2
68. In correspondence, the Reporters have indicated that they are still pondering the issue of whether
conflicts in the mediation context can and should be handled in the Restatement, either by commentary or by
reference to the considerations of Model Rule 1.7 (governing general conflicts) or Model Rule 2.2 (governing
intermediation between existing clients). See RESTATEMENT DRAr I § 211 rep. note cmt. b (noting that the two
types of cases covered by section 211, representation of multiple clients with common interests and
representation of multiple clients with different interests, that need to be resolved in order to accomplish a
common objective, are covered by counterparts in Model Rules 1.7 and 2.2).
69. Such rules include Model Rules 1.7 (general conflicts), 1.9 (conflicts involving former clients), and 1.10
(imputed disqualification). MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.7; id. Rule 1.9; id. Rule 1.10.
70. Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) allows a lawyer to use information, gained from a formerly represented client, to
the disadvantage of that client when the information "has become generally known." Id. Rule 1.9(c)(1). Model
Rule 1.6 also permits use of such information when the client consents after consultation or when the lawyer
"reasonably believes" it necessary in order to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that could result
in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm," id. Rule 1.6, or to establish a claim or defense in a variety of
proceedings where the lawyer-client relationship becomes attenuated. Id. Lastly, Model Rule 3.3 forbids a
lawyer from knowingly failing to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when such disclosure would be necessary
to avoid assisting "a criminal or fraudulent act" by the client. Id. Rule 3.3. This rule also requires a lawyer, in ex
parte proceedings, to disclose "material facts... which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision,
whether or not the facts are adverse." Id.
71. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.7(c)(l)-(2).
72. Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-95 (D. Utah 1995). In Poly Software, a
substantively expert lawyer in intellectual property matters served as a mediator for two former employees and
their employer over the alleged misappropriation of software documentation. Id. It is likely, if not totally certain,
that in that context the mediator learned who actually was responsible for the alleged theft of software
documentation. Following the successful resolution of the mediation, the two employees formed their own
entity, and eventually one of them accused the other of software documentation theft. Id. One of the parties
sought representation from the knowledgeable mediator who was disqualified in the subsequent legal action
between the parties because of his obvious ability to take advantage of the information he had learned about the
adverse party in the mediation. Id. This case typifies a real and continuing theoretical and practical problem in
the mediation field. Some choose wise and knowledgeable mediators precisely because they know the field, the
parties, and/or how the industry conducts its business. This practice parallels historical use of the "wise elder"
in mediation, who was often quite embedded in the community from which the dispute or problem arose. See,
e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, CouRTs: A COMPARATIVE AND POLMnCAL ANALYSIs 6 (1981) (discussing history of "big
men" wise elders in dispute resolution); JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WInHOUT LAW? (1983) (describing history
of alternative dispute resolution in the United States). Such mediators are skillful, expert, and knowledgeable;
they are also likely to be deep in conflicts. The American model of mediation has demanded neutrality and
objectivity, paralleling the requirements for our disinterested judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (enumerating the
circumstances under which a judge must disqualify himself for lack of impartiality). Thus, the American system
often has difficulty with the tensions between expertise, and the conflicts it can bring, and neutrality, which is
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the role of the mediator can be analogized to that of the lawyer representative
when information is learned that is considered confidential and proprietary.
Under the rubric of Model Rule 1.9 and its equivalents in Restatement sections
201, 202, and 213, 73 the former mediator could not subsequently represent one of
the parties to a mediation against the other former party without consent. In the
Poly Software court's analysis, the mediator's subsequent representation was
deemed to be a "substantially related matter", 74 and the mediator and his firm
could not participate in the knowledge or use of information learned through the
prior mediation. 75 This reasoning by analogy could easily be applied to "subse-
quent" representation from mediation problems, and rules that track Model Rule
1.9 but apply to mediation easily could be written.76 Similarly, Restatement
section 21377 could be re-drafted to include this situation, or at the very least,
often accompanied by lack of knowledge about the underlying context of the dispute. In reality, this problem is
particularly acute in relatively small specialized areas of law, like intellectual property, where as in Poly
Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1491-95, the most knowledgeable lawyers are sought after as the most competent to
both mediate and represent in the same geographical area. This problem has become real in at least one court
program that utilizes expert "neutral evaluators" and adheres to the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 455, thus
preventing lawyers from having interests in ongoing litigation and mediation at the same time. The result has
been that lawyers, who see themselves as making more money through representation, refuse to serve as
court-appointed neutrals, especially in voluntary, non-paid court programs. While I owe this observation to the
thoughtful comments of Stephanie Smith, former Director of Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs for the
Northern District of California, I am unable to find anything in her writings to memorialize it.
73. Note that the Restatement has taken a different position on law firm imputation and screening in section
204 than currently exists in Model Rule 1.10. Compare RESTATEMENT DRAFr 1 § 204(2)(b) (providing that if a
lawyer is subject to screening measures with respect to involvement in prior representation, his or her firm
affiliates are not subject to imputation) with MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.10(a) (requiring imputation for all members of
a firm whether or not screening measures are taken). The change to permit scieening under the Restatement,
where it was not strictly allowed in the Model Rules (though often permitted by decisional law in many
jurisdictions), has implications for the ADR conflicts I discuss here, as it has provoked more general debate in
the area of representation. It is possible to argue that if screening is sanctioned in any situation, it might be both
more appropriate (confidentiality of the mediator is promised as against all persons anyway) and less
appropriate (the public appearance of impropriety when a former neutral joins forces with the now adversary
representative) in the mediation or even arbitration context. Note that the current rules do permit screening in
the judicial and arbitration context. MODEL RULES Rule 1.12. This approach, however, was rejected in Cho v.
Superior Court where a judge, though acting in a judicial capacity, actually was performing a mediative role.
Cho v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995).
74. MODEL RULES Rule 1.9.
75. Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1493-95.
76. See text accompanying notes 130-36 for one such suggested formulation.
77. § 213. Representation Adverse to Interest of Former Client
Unless both the affected present and former clients consent to the representation under the limitations
and conditions provided in § 202, a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter may not thereafter
represent another client in the same or a substantially related matter in which the interests of the
former client are materially adverse. The current matter is substantially related to the earlier matter if:
(1) the current matter involves the work the lawyer performed for the former client; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that representation of the present client will involve the use of
information acquired in the course of representing the former client, unless that information has
become generally known.
RESTATEMENT DRAFr 1 § 213.
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illustrations and examples taken from these decided cases could inform the
readership of the Restatement that such principles of conflict of interest will be
applied in mediation to subsequent adversary representation situations.
Another possibility, with perhaps less work required of the drafters, would be
to adopt Professor Nancy Moore's view that section 21678 of the Restatement
could be read or interpreted to impose on the mediator a fiduciary obligation to
parties in a mediation.79 Thus, mediators would have a responsibility not to
accept subsequent representation of any party to a mediation, unless both parties
consent.
Both Cho80 and Poly Software8' demonstrate that conflicts may occur when a
lawyer acts as a mediator, judge, or arbitrator and then either that same lawyer or
someone in the lawyer's law firm seeks to take on a subsequent adversary
representation of a party to the earlier dispute resolution case. It is important to
note, however, that analogous but somewhat different problems arise from the
reverse order of events. The propriety of whether a lawyer can serve as a
third-party neutral in a matter in which the lawyer or the lawyer's firm previously
represented one of the parties in an adversary matter comes into question. Also
questionable is the issue of whether it matters that the case is either related or
unrelated. The difference with representation prior to a mediation is that the
78. § 216 Lawyer with Fiduciary or Other Legal Obligation to Third Person
Unless the affected client consents to the representation under the limitations and conditions provided
in § 202, a lawyer may not represent a client in any matter with respect to which the lawyer has a
fiduciary or other legal obligation to another if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's obligation.
Id. § 216.
79. Professor Moore made this suggestion for interpretation, perhaps with a clarifying illustration in section
216, at the February 7, 1997 Symposium sponsored by The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics. Pros and
Cons, supra note 63, at 32. Note that the description of "other legal obligation" found in Restatement section
216 could be construed to include both contractual and court-defined rules and responsibilities defining the
mediator-party relationship from the mediation itself as limiting subsequent representation (unless the clients
consent, as provided in that section). Note also that the important issue of how and when contracts between legal
professionals and their "clients" (including parties to mediations or arbitrations) will affect both ethics rules and
the Restatement is particularly significant in the ADR area where contracts between the parties, rules of courts,
and the ethical codes promulgated by professional associations or provider organizations, such as the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), provide a rich source of ethical pluralism and potential conflicts of law
problems. In the absence of clear text in the Model Rules and now in the Restatement, judges and disciplinary
bodies providing the analysis and sources of ethics standards and reasoning can look to such multiple sources of
law. Cases often refer to the contracts between the parties, the rules of the court, and the standards or codes of
professional associations like the Model Rules or the governing ethical codes for different kinds of disputes
promulgated by ADR provider organizations such as the AAA. See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLAPINGER AND DONNA
STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DisTRiCT COURTS: A SoURcE BOOK FOR JUDGES AND
LAWYERS (1996) (surveying the rules, including some ethical requirements, of current ADR and settlement
procedures in the ninety-four federal district courts); Linda Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics and
Erie, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 89 (1995) (addressing the absence of a uniform code of professional conduct in
federal courts where litigators are likely to be subject to unfamiliar and unpublished local court rules).
80. Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995).
81. Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995).
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conflicts issues more easily can be dealt with by consent of all the parties. The
current parties to a mediation would likely know or be informed of the firm's
prior involvement with either of the parties. Thus, once the firm's prior involve-
ment is recognized, the parties may decide if, in fact, the mediator or arbitrator
can be neutral. However, as the Al-Harbi v. Citibank82 case makes clear, in
modem practice such conflicts may not be knowable at the relevant time.
It is important to note that the court in Al-Harbi confined itself to the potential
harm to the parties alone, as distinguished from the concern that the "appearance
of bias" 83 must not exist in any "tribunal permitted by law to try cases and
controversies" addressed by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings
Corporation v. Continental Casualty Co. 84 Thus, when an attorney changes roles
from third-party neutraling to representation or vice versa the more general
ethical principle, and one eschewed by the Restatement, of avoiding the appear-
82. 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Al-Harbi, a party learned that the arbitrator's previous law firm had
represented one of the parties only after the previously represented party had won the arbitration. Id. at 682. The
discovering party claimed that the arbitration had to be set aside on the grounds of evident partiality under the
fairly strict standards of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 682. A federal circuit court of appeals rejected the
claim, holding that the arbitrator did not know of the representation and therefore was not biased. Id. at 683.
Further, the court noted that his relationship to the law firm no longer existed. Id. at 682.
83. Id. at 683.
84. 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). As I suggested at the Symposium, ethics rules on conflicts for third-party
neutrals might have to refer back to the dreaded language of "appearance of impropriety" from the old Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL CODE Canon 9 (1983). This language animated much of the
conflicts rules, as well as its own separate canon. Id. Geoffrey Hazard responded that this "appearance of
impropriety" was a "garbage standard;" he would prefer to reconsider explicitly making the disqualification in
Model Rule 1.12 stronger by eliminating screens in cases where judges, as in Cho v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995), join practices with attorneys representing cases that were formerly before the judge.
Pros and Cons, supra note 63, at 31-32. 1 am no fan of this vague and broad term either, but recently I have had
occasion to see that it expresses the values of what our lawyering activities look like to outsiders, which seems
particularly relevant to consideration of ethical issues in the use of alternative dispute resolution. The ABA
Conference on Professionalism devoted a session to the question of whether we need to restore more general
statements of values in our ethics codes. Program, ABA 23rd National Conference on Professional Responsibil-
ity, Naples, Florida, May 29-31, 1997, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Have We Lost Our
Professional Values? (on file with the author). Another circuit court of appeals has ruled that, in certain
circumstances, arbitrators may have a higher duty of investigation of conflicts. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d
1043 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that under the Arbitration Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
an arbitrator has a duty to investigate all possible conflicts and can be disqualified for failing to uncover one).
Without exploring all of the distinguishing details here, it is significant to note just how contradictory the
different requirements are in conflict situations of different ethical standards in the variety of contexts in which
arbitration (or mediation) is conducted. As at least one judge has opined that just because the AAA has chosen to
enact "higher" standards in its disclosure and impartiality ethics codes, does not mean that a court must enforce
them if the parties' conduct meets the "weaker" statutory standards of the Federal Arbitration Act under section
10. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). For a discussion of the
standards that are supposed to be applied under the Federal Arbitration Act for impartiality of arbitrators, see
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that prior
relationship between a "neutral" third arbitrator and one of the parties was sufficient to overturn the arbitral
award). Some current rules, including the Model Rules, recognize that in tri-partite arbitration panels,
"partisan" party-appointed arbitrators are exempt from neutrality requirements, as well as subsequent
representation disqualifications. MODEL RuLEs ANN., supra note 32, Rule 1.12, at 198 ("When a party to an
arbitration selects 'its' member of an arbitration panel, that arbitrator is exempt from the ban of Rule 1.12.").
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ance of impropriety might express the concerns of outsiders looking at a
particular act of representation or dispute resolution. It may not seem fair to
outsiders looking in when seemingly neutral actors represent former parties to a
mediation or arbitration, or when representation occurs before a dispute resolu-
tion process. The neutrals may have financially gained from the prior representa-
tion, and they may not be able to easily forget or disregard their loyalty or
allegiance to a prior client.
3. The Variety of Roles in ADR
The variations of roles performed by third-party neutrals in ADR, including
mediators of both facilitative and evaluative stripes,85 neutral and partisan
arbitrators, and early neutral evaluators - all distinguished from judges and
judicial officers 86 - may be so complex and new in their development that the
construction of different rules and responsibilities for these new roles may be too
advanced for a backward looking restatement of the law. 87 Given the complexity
of the different roles, the Reporters may prefer to let other professional associa-
tions or bodies attempt to regulate the difficult requirements of disclosures,
neutrality, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, fees, and other matters,88 and wait
until adequate case law permits fuller restatements of the law. Nevertheless, the
85. Numerous articles distinguish between evaluative mediators who, as part of their settlement efforts, go so
far as to predict how a court would resolve a dispute, and facilitative mediators who avoid offering evaluations,
focusing instead on enhancing communication between the parties so they can decide what to do. E.g., DWIGHT
GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES § 1.1.4 (1996); Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators'Orientations,
Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 23-24 (1996); Kimberlee
Kovach & Lela Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LmG.,
March 1996, at 31 (arguing that mediators should only perform facilitative functions because evaluative
mediation jeopardizes neutrality and discourages understanding between the parties).
86. Judicial officers themselves have been examining the ethics of judicial behavior in settlement confer-
ences. JONA GOLDSCHMIDT & LISA MILORD, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIErY, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT ETHICS:
JUDGES' GUIDE (1996); Videotape: Ethical Issues in Judicial Settlement (American Judicature Society 1996) (on
file with the author).
87. This view often has been expressed by the Director of the American Law Institute, Geoffrey Hazard, and
the reporters of the Restatement. However, I am unable to find anything in the writing to memorialize it.
88. Because I think that current efforts of some professional associations have been inadequate to the task of
specifying standards and rules, I entreat the reporters of the Restatement to consider what they can do to
acknowledge the important role of non-adversarial duties of third-party neutrals. The current and much touted
JOINT STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 13, provides only the most general of statements and thus, is
particularly unhelpful in particular instances. Id. For example, the conflict of interest section appears to be based
primarily on principles of voluntary disclosure and consent by the parties, but does not provide an adequate
definition of conflict or bias. Id. § III. The comments to the section on "quality of the process" provide that
mediators should facilitate the parties' voluntary agreements and not give professional advice to the parties. Id.
§ VI cmt. This section flies in the face of the actual practice of many mediators who predict, evaluate, and in
some cases, even suggest substantive solutions to the parties, based on their assessments of potential liabilities.
Margaret Shaw, Continuum for Mediator Evaluator Roles, Presented to CPR-Georgetown Commission on May
6-7, 1996 (on file with the author). To the extent the Joint Standards for Mediators were an effort to create a
multi-disciplinary code of conduct for lawyers and non-lawyer mediators, its achievement at generalizing is a
failure to provide specific guidance about actual practices.
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Reporters should reconsider whether they need to take account, in some way, of
these new and varied roles of third-party neutrals who are lawyers, given that
they are affected by currently existing ethics rules and particular sections of the
Restatement.
4. The Restatement's View of ADR: It Exists Only if it Confirms Conventional
Lawyer Roles of Self-Protection and Adversarial Representation
It is somewhat ironic to note that in a detailed review of the currently
considered sections of the Restatement, I uncovered several references to
alternative dispute resolution. However, arbitration and mediation were refer-
enced almost exclusively in the context of protecting lawyer interests in such
areas as fee89 and malpractice matters,90 and protecting work resulting.from the
adversarial work of representative lawyers in ADR proceedings. 9' There is a
suggestion of mediation or some such procedure where multiple clients have
conflicting interests in a transactional matter. One does not have to be a
conspiracy theorist to note that ADR is only recognized by ethics rule drafters
when it protects the lawyer's interest in privacy, the processing pace of fee and
malpractice arbitrations, and the choice of forum and decision maker,92 or when
the rules focus on the more traditional adversarial role of lawyers within ADR,
such as work-product protection.
Even though reference is made to ADR, the Restatement does not explicitly
deal with such important issues as candor to the tribunal, attorney conflicts of
interest, neutrality or impartiality requirements,93 specialized disclosure and
89. RESTATEMENT DRAFr I § 54 cmt. b.
90. RESTATEMENT DRAFT 8 § 76 cmt. b.
91. RESTATEMENT DRAFT 1 § 136 cmt. h.
92. This echoes the increasing use of arbitration in medical care, banking, consumer transactions, and other
places where the powerful are alleged to be taking advantage of less informed or less powerful clients. See Barry
Meier, In Small Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1997, at AI, D7 (claiming that
large corporations and medical providers use small print to contract away consumers' rights to sue by requiring
them to resolve disputes through arbitration); see also Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903,
917-20 (Cal. 1997) (holding that statements made in health plan's advertising campaign regarding the speed,
efficiency, and cost of arbitration process can be read as fraudulent misrepresentations to the subscriber where
there is no compliance with represented terms in actual arbitration programs).
93. The concern about impartiality in the functioning of ADR neutrals has led to the suggestion that the
Judicial Code of Conduct may be the appropriate place to look for guidance in these matters. MODEL CODE OF
JuDiciAL CONDucr (American Bar Ass'n, 1990). I do not think these rules guide the attorney neutral, who may
be faced with evaluating or giving legal advice during an ADR proceeding that might, whether correctly or not,
lead to reliance by parties in ways for which judges could not ever be liable, or disciplined for giving an opinion
about the law in their proceedings. As I have stated elsewhere, mediators who are lawyers may be interjected
into the legal process, with concomitant ethical obligations in ways that are different from arbitrators and
judges. Menkel-Meadow, Ancillary Practice, supra note 55, at 15; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the
Practice of Law?, NIDR NEWS, MarJApr. 1996, at 1, 4. To the extent that the substantive law of third-party
liability is increasing lawyers' liabilities to third parties outside the privity of the legal representational
relationship, this presents different dilemmas for the lawyer mediator who has parties - particularly if
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confidentiality requirements, as well as the more arcane issues of fees, interdisci-
plinary practice, and liability to third parties. While the Restatement does
recognize the existence of practices of ADR in a number of sections, there is little
recognition of the less adversarial roles of lawyers or of how clients might be
apprised of or benefit from other legal problem-solving processes.94 Thus, the
drafters should consider how these processes are affected by other Restatement
pronouncements on lawyers' duties and obligations.
For example, should the proposed Chapter One of the Restatement, which
outlines the regulation of the legal profession, provide some guidance for how
lawyer-mediators/arbitrators might be held accountable for their actions? Such
guidance might include proposed regulations for application of standard disciplin-
ary proceedings, motions to disqualify, and dispute resolution processes like
those adopted in Cho95 and Poly Software,96 as well as separate disciplinary
proceedings for court appointed mediators like those currently used in Florida
97
and Minnesota.98 Moreover, should Chapter One make reference to court
interpretations of both statutory and contractual language on such matters as bias,
neutrality, disclosures, conflicts, and incompetence? 99 Finally, in Chapter Two
where the lawyer's duties to the client are elaborated, why not follow Colorado's
unrepresented - who rely on what the mediator says. See generally Symposium, The Lawyer's Duties and
Liabilities to Third Parties, 37 S. Thx. L REV. 957 (1996) (presenting an array of articles attempting to define the
proper scope of a lawyer's liability to third-parties).
94. In this sense, the treatment of ADR in the Restatement could be said to suffer from the kind of lawyer
self-interest that Stephen Gillers notes with respect to fee regulation. See generally Gillers, supra note 11 for
such a discussion regarding lawyer self-interest and fee regulation. Others have noted judicial self-interest in
some forms of judicial action. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules
of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 627 (1994) (developing a framework that will predict the contours of federal
procedural rules based on the valid assumption that such rules will reflect judicial self-interest because they are
usually construed by and promulgated under the direction of judges) with Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges'Self
Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (focusing on judges'
self-interest with respect to caseload reduction, and claiming that Macey's framework fails to acknowledge the
fact that most federal judges are white, male, middle-aged or older, and wealtly, thus explaining why procedural
rules are often aligned with maintaining the status quo rather than upholding the public interest).
95. Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995).
96. Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995).
97. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 44.106 (1990) (empowering Florida Supreme Court to establish minimum
disciplinary standards and procedures for mediators and arbitrators); Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for
Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 20 FLA. ST. L. REv. 701, 719-23
(1992) (describing how the Florida Mediator Qualifications Board, complaint committees, and the staff of the
Florida Dispute Resolution Center work together to enforce the mediator standards of conduct that are
promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court).
98. See Duane W. Krohnke, Minnesota Takes Up ADR Ethics Challenge, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF
LmG., Nov. 1996, at 121 (reporting on the efforts of the Minnesota Supreme Court's ADR Review Board to
develop a code of ethics for ADR neutrals, later passed as MwN. GEN. PRAc. R. 114 (1997)).
99. Court consideration of such matters can arise under attempts to void arbitration awards or mediation
agreements on statutory or other grounds or in liability claims against mediators or arbitrators based on such
theories as breach of contract or breach of fiduciary or statutory duty to the parties. Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917-20 (Cal. 1997).
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example' ° and include some reference to the lawyer's duty to counsel and advise
clients with respect to all the various methods of case disposition, including
ADR,'' thus advancing a client's lawful objectives?10 2
It is somewhat ironic to note that the Restatement only recognizes the role of
arbitration in fee disputes between lawyers and clients and in malpractice
actions,10 3 yet suggests that an arbitration agreement "should meet standards of
fairness."'' 4 Mediation, arbitration, and even "alternative dispute resolution
100. See COLO. CT. R.P.C. Rule 2.1 (requiring a lawyer, when anticipating litigation, to "advise the client of
alternative forms of dispute resolution that might reasonably be pursued to attempt to resolve the legal dispute
or to reach the legal objective sought"); see also Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp.,
Informal Op. 90-125 (1991) (advising that an attorney is obligated to communicate to client a proposal of
mediation made by opposing counsel); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof. and Jud. Ethics, Op. RI-255
(1996) (holding that an attorney must inform client of opposing party's offer to resolve a pending dispute
through alternative dispute resolution forums); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof. and Jud. Ethics,
Op. RI-262 (1996) (holding that an attorney must recommend alternatives to litigation when an alternative is a
reasonable course of action to further the client's interests, or if the attorney has any reason to think that the
client would find the alternative desirable); Arthur Garwin, Show Me the Offer: When Opposing Counsel
Suggests Mediation, Your Client Needs to Know, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 84 (reporting on states that require
lawyers to counsel clients about offers to mediate).
101. Section 211 of the Restatement, the equivalent of Model Rule 2.2, addresses representation of
"co-clients" in transactional, non-litigation matters, and recognizes that multiple prospective clients might have
interests and objectives that are antagonistic to some degree. RESTATEMENT DRAFT 1 § 211 cmt. a. That
Restatement section suggests that service by a lawyer, arbitrator, or mediator, not representing the parties, might
serve such clients' interests. If mediation or arbitration might be appropriate in transactional multi-party
situations, one begins to wonder why a lawyer should not also explore the possible assistance of an arbitrator or
mediator in litigation matters as well. The failure of the Restatement to suggest ADR counseling to litigation
clients may be an indication of how powerful the anti-ADR forces are among litigating lawyers who dominate
the drafting of all ethics rules.
102. See RESTATEMENT DRAFT 1 §§ 28, 31, 33 (addressing lawyer's duty to inform and consult with client on
decisions regarding the representation, especially in settlement decisions); Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Bea
Moulton, Who Decides: Lawyer and Client Decision making About Dispute Resolution (Sept. 1989) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author) (exploring new issues that have emerged to challenge traditional and
alternative models of lawyer-client decision-making about how to proceed with a dispute).
103. For a good review of the current status of arbitration in legal malpractice actions, see Robert A.
Creamer, Arbitration of Lawyer-Client Disputes, ATr'ys' LIABILITY AND ASSURANCE Soc'Y Loss PREVENTION J.,
May 1996, at 12.
104. RESTATEMENT DRAFT 1 § 54 cmt. b(iv). Section 54, which suggests arbitration as a possible remedy for a
fee dispute between a lawyer and client, is the first formal recognition of alternative dispute resolution in the
Restatement. The Restatement also suggests that clients and lawyers may agree to arbitrate legal malpractice
claims. RESTATEMENT DRAFT 8 § 76 cmt. b. However the Restatement ignores the use of ADR in general
litigation or problems with others, supporting the cynical view that ADR is referenced only when it might be
favored by lawyers to resolve their own professional disputes.
One of the Reporters advises me that he expects to "draft some words on the immunity from damages suits of
lawyers acting as judges, arbitrators and mediators" that would accurately reflect and restate the current case
law. Letter from John Leubsdorf, July 7, 1996, supra note 9. See also, e.g., RESTATEMENT DRAFr 8 § 71 rep. note
cmt. d (reviewing situations where lawyers act in capacities in which they are immune from civil liability);
Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that "[albsolute quasi-judicial immunity
extends to mediators and case evaluators in the [D.C.] Superior Court's ADR process"); cf. Howard v. Drapkin
271 Cal. Rprt. 893, 905 (Ct. App. 1990) (extending quasi-judicial immunity to a psychologist acting as a neutral
third person engaged in efforts to resolve a family law dispute); Myers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social
Services, 812 F.2d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987) (extending absolute immunity to conciliation court employees
participating under court directives in the resolution of family disputes).
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proceedings such as mediation or a mini-trial" 10 5 are similarly, if ironically,
referenced in the adversarial context of protecting material in preparation for
these proceedings as "work-product." 06
To the extent that most sections of the Restatement contemplate a lawyer-client
relationship, reference to additional duties and obligations as a result of non-
client relations may be difficult to accomplish. On the other hand, as John
Leubsdorft0 7 has suggested, it might be possible to specify in the introductory
portions of the Restatement that some professional rules apply to lawyers acting
as third-party neutrals and that others do not.10 8 Another possibility is to create a
whole separate section on third-party neutrals and place it within Topic Three of
Chapter Six. Such a section could specify the current legal rules and obligations
of lawyers serving in these neutral roles. A final possibility is to handle specific
topics like conflicts of interest and duty to the tribunal seriatim.
5. Confidentiality
It should be recognized by the Restatement that conventional duties such as
confidentiality' °9 should be addressed with respect to ADR. For example,
third-party neutrals, who would not ordinarily have the conventional attorney-
client privilege or confidentiality rules applied to them, may in fact hear
information that is quite proprietary. Settlement facts - information learned
within the neutral setting that may not be legally relevant but that affects the
possibility of settlement - are not unlike the secrets of clients protected under
the Model Rules. While third-party neutrals may offer parties confidentiality
pursuant to contracts, court rules, statutes," ° or professional norms or rules, the
Reporters have not clarified that there are situations outside of the conventional
lawyer-client role in which a lawyer might obtain confidential information that
should be protected and could, in fact, be the subject of a disciplinary action or
liability if revealed."'
105. RESTATEMENT DRAFr 1 § 136 cmt. h.
106. Id. This shows that the drafters clearly know such ADR proceedings exist and that they recognize ADR
when adversarial values, such as the proprietary attorney work-product doctrine, are to be protected. If the
Restatement can protect the work of advocates in the ADR process, one wonders why it cannot consider the
protections needed and rules necessary to guide and discipline the third-party neutrals of ADR.
107. Professor of Law, The State University of New Jersey. Rutgers University, School of Law-Newark, S.I.
Newhouse Center for Law and Justice.
108. Letter from John Leubsdorf, July 7, 1996, supra note 9.
109. RESTATEMENT DRAFt I §§ 111-142 (covering confidentiality responsibilities of lawyers, attorney-client
privilege, and lawyer work-product immunity).
110. Increasingly, states are passing independent confidentiality protections for conversations and document
exchanges in mediation. Some grant a mediator privilege against disclosure, and others promise no more
confidentiality than would be accorded under the appropriate evidence code to any statements made in
contemplation of settlement. For a survey, see NANcY H. RoGERS AND CRAiro A. McEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW,
PoLIcY AND PRACIcE Ch. 9 (2d. ed. 1994 & Supp. 1996).
11I. See Joshua P. Rosenberg, Note, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and Conflict of
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With respect to mediator confidentiality, the general rule that lawyers may
"divulge confidences to facilitate law practice within a firm" 1 2 proves problem-
atic. Trouble arises in cases like Cho' 13 and in the application of screens in firms
with ADR practices where mediators promise complete confidentiality to the
parties to encourage candor on the theory that this will improve the possibility of
settlement in situations where adverse parties are disclosing information in each
other's presence."14 Then to the extent that mediators seek advice in their own
law firms about their cases, the traditional rule that "you can share it with your
firm" conflicts with what the mediator guaranteed the parties. It is because we
fear, and in some cases know, that mediators, like all professionals, will share
some information with their co-workers to obtain assistance with their work, that
we fear the screen will not really work in conflict situations. Of course, it is also
problematic that this appears to be an acknowledgment that confidentiality
promises are often breached in mediation practices.
6. Liability
In providing the standards and terms of lawyer liability, the Restatement
recognizes, in comments if not text, that lawyers may act as mediators. Section 71
recognizes that lawyers may act in capacities other than legal representation, such
as trustees, executors, escrow agents, brokers, or mediators and thus would be
liable under "applicable law assigned to that capacity." 115 The same section
provides that if a certain function is immune from civil liability, such as "judges,
arbitrators and other neutrals who resolve disputes," 116 then a lawyer acting in
such a capacity is likewise immune from civil liability.
1 7
While section 73 of the Restatement imposes duties of care on lawyers to
Laws, 10 OMo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 157, 181 (1994) (arguing that because "[a] sense of trust and informality is
paramount to mediation proceedings," courts should recognize a confidential communications privilege in the
mediation context to help bolster the effectiveness ofADR); cf. Shabazz v. Scuff, 662 F Supp. 90, 94 (S.D. Iowa
1987) (holding that communications received by a prison ombudsperson are privileged and cannot be repeated
in court or used in investigations); Garstang v. Superior Ct., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 533-37 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that communications made during mediation sessions before ombudsperson employed by private
educational institution were protected by qualified privilege based upon right to privacy conferred by California
Constitution). But see Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 792-95 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
confidential communications made by employee to company ombudsperson who investigated and mediated
workplace disputes were not privileged from disclosure in employment discrimination lawsuit).
112. RESTATEMENT DRAFr 1 § 112 cmt. g.
113. Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995).
114. To the extent that section 125 of the Restatement specifies a privilege of confidentiality of information
as between two co-represented parties and their lawyer, this section could be read, by analogy, to include the
obligation of a third-party neutral to protect the confidences of non-client parties, at least as against anyone else.
RESTATEMENT DRAFT I § 125(1).
115. RESTATEMENT DRAFr 8 § 71 cmt. d.
116. Id. Once again, ADR is recognized here as a way of protecting lawyers from accountability or
malpractice in such a third-party neutral role, so long as applicable law outside of the Restatement so provides.
117. Id.
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non-clients (most often those interacting with or relying on the actions of a
represented client)," 8 there is no formal recognition in the Restatement of duties
to non-clients (such as parties to ADR proceedings) who may also rely on the
statements, representations, evaluations, or predictions of third-party neutrals.
While no case that I am aware of has yet held a mediator liable to a non-client
(usually an unrepresented party) to a mediation or other form of ADR, I have
heard of parties who rely on what third-party neutrals tell them, both in
court-mandated programs and in contracted for arbitration or mediation programs
(especially when being told what the "likely outcome" of a case is for purposes
of deciding whether to accept a settlement or not). Eventually courts will likely
face the question of whether, with all the proper disclosures, third-party neutrals
who are not "representatives" of clients can safely disclaim any liability in such
circumstances." 9 If those who rely on legal opinions prepared for others, or
members of organizations, unions, or beneficiaries of wills, can hold lawyers
liable (as the trend seems to indicate1 20 ), non-client parties to certain kinds of
ADR proceedings may eventually be able to hold third-party neutrals to some
standard of care.
Of course, the answer that arbitrators are not practicing law when they decide
cases (as judges are not) and that mediators may be held to whatever malpractice
standard mediators are held to as a matter of other applicable law may take the
issue of third-party neutral liability outside the scope of the Restatement, but let
me suggest that the issues are more complicated. In current practices of different
kinds of mediation, including more evaluative mediation, non-represented parties
may rely on mediator predictions of legal rights and outcomes, potentially to a
greater extent even than those who rely on attorney opinion letters.1 2 1 While the
mediator is clearly not the party's agent, in other contexts some (including
Restatement Adviser Nancy Moore) have suggested that third-party neutrals may
have fiduciary responsibilities toward parties in some forms of ADR. Thus, some
expression of the potential claims or bases for liability of third-party neutrals
might require, at the very least, some explanatory material or illustrations.
122
118. Id. § 73.
119. See generally Symposium, supra note 93 (discussing lawyers' duties to third parties, including
beneficiaries of wills, those who rely on legal opinions prepared for others, and members of organizations and
labor unions).
120. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Privity Requirement Reconsidered, 37 S. TEx. L. REV. 967 (1996)
(claiming that "[t]he notion of privity has lost its place as a limitation on liability in practically all spheres of tort
liability except that of lawyer malpractice").
121. See generally, e.g., Edward A. Carr, Attorney Opinion Letters: Model Rule 2.3 and the Texas
Experience, 37 S. TEx. L. REV. 1127 (1996) (focusing on professional responsibility and lawyer liability issues
in the situation where a client asks the lawyer to prepare an evaluation or an opinion for use by a third party);
Leslie Griffin, Post-Conference Reflections: Whose Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties? 37 S. Tx. L. REv.
1191 (1996) (arguing that lawyers should be subject to the same legal and moral standards as all other
professionals when they offer opinions or evaluations to third parties).
122. I recognize that the Reporters may not have sufficient familiarity with the different processes of ADR to
be able to comment, on or define the potential types of, liability, but given that the Restatement is more than a
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A related, but somewhat distinct, issue arises with respect to the troubling issue
of whether a lawyer-mediator who presides over a mediation and comes to know
(under the requisite definitions of knowledge) that a lawyer has committed a
violation of an applicable rule of professional conduct that "raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer," '
23
has a duty to report such actions to the appropriate disciplinary authorities, which
as a lawyer, he or she would have a duty to do. 12 4 Failure to comply with this
section subjects the lawyer to his or her own possible disciplinary action1 25 (and
far-fetched as it might seem now, possible liability to parties injured by the
"guilty" lawyer's mal- or misfeasance in the mediation). There are several
interpretations of this rule as they affect mediation that may render this concern
somewhat insubstantial, but they may remain problematic within the mediation
community, and the Reporters might help clarify these points. First, it easily can
be said that the mediator, like anyone else performing other than strictly
conventional legal roles (like real estate broker, trustee, sales agent, etc.) or
anyone engaged in "ancillary" practice 26 must still abide by the lawyers' ethical
rules and violates them at the risk of disciplinary action as a lawyer. 127 As a
result, a real estate broker, like a mediator, who violates an ethical rule may be
censored, suspended, or disbarred as a lawyer for acts performed in "non-legal"
capacities. Thus, the current rules could be seen to cover the mediator who is also
a lawyer, in this, as in all other contexts; perhaps, though, some clarifying
language is necessary.
More problematic, however, is the exception for disclosure of ethical viola-
tions (going to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer) when
restatement of ethics codes and does purport to describe the possible bases for civil liability for legal
professionals, some attention to the issues of civil liability of lawyers acting as third-party neutrals would seem
to be appropriate, given the coverage of the relevant sections. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT DRAFT 8 § 73 cmt. e
(stating that when a lawyer or that lawyer's client invites a non-client to rely on the lawyer's legal services, and
the non-client reasonably does so, that lawyer owes a duty of care to the non-client unless the jurisdiction's tort
law excludes liability on the ground of remoteness); id. § 152 (covering evaluations undertaken by lawyers for
third persons). Though evaluations by mediators and other third-party neutrals are not done for third parties by
represented client requests, they are sometimes requested by one party to a mediation who seeks to have both
parties informed by a legal judgment or prediction in order to facilitate settlement. Marjorie Corman Aaron,
Evaluation in Mediation, in GOLANN, supra note 12, at 267.
123. MODEL RULES Rule 8.3.
124. Id.
125. Id.; id.§ 8.4 (stating that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... violate or attempt to violate
the rules of Professional Conduct ... "); see also In Re Himmel, 553 N.E. 2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (suspending a
client's second lawyer when second lawyer had knowledge that client's first lawyer converted client's funds).
126. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 5.7 (subjecting lawyers to the Model Rules even when they provide
"law-related services" that are not prohibited as the unauthorized practice of law when provided by a
non-lawyer); Geoffrey Hazard, When ADR is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts
Issues, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LiG., Dec. 1994, at 147 (stating the ADR practices that are "ancillary"
to law practice must still abide by ethical rules applicable to lawyers).
127. MODEL RULES Rule 5.7.
19971
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
that information is learned in situations protected by Model Rule 1.6128 (protec-
tion of client's confidences). There are several problems here. First, the lawyer-
mediator who becomes knowledgeable about ethical violations during a media-
tion is not learning such information in what is otherwise called client
confidentiality situations precisely because we have otherwise defined the media-
tor's role to be one not of representation - thus, no client confidentiality, strictly
defined, applies. On the other hand, mediation promises confidentiality to all of
the parties, either contractually, or as is true now in many cases, statutorily.
129
Just as some states now protect lawyer assistance programs (for alcohol or drug
or other counseling assistance) from disclosure requirements on policy grounds, 130
arguments could be made that complete confidentiality (as in the attorney-client
relationship) is necessary to protect the purposes and integrity of the mediation
process. The difficulty is that mediator-lawyers are often in a position to see
ethical violations, perhaps more easily than judges and other lawyers in more
conventional adversary proceedings. Lawyers, as well as clients, are told, in
mediation, to be candid and to disclose information that might not be relevant or
discoverable in litigation but that might help facilitate a business or other
interest-based solution. Lawyer-mediators who work closely with parties and
their lawyers in confidential caucus sessions, and thus hear such sensitive
information from both sides, may be particularly well situated to learn of
fraudulent statements, to see serious legal malpractice (failure to research, lack of
knowledge of important legal authorities, failure to investigate, etc.), and to see
lawyers make misrepresentations of facts or law to each other or to the
mediator-tribunal. 31 At any meeting of mediator-lawyers, these issues arise, and
I am convinced there is wide disparity in our practices. 
32
The Restatement might clarify what I have always taken to be the applicable
standard: lawyer-mediators are still subject to lawyers' ethics rules. The Report-
128. Id. Rule 1.6 ("Confidentiality of Information").
129. See, e.g., CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1152.5 (Deering 1986) (providing that when certain conditions are met,
"[e]vidence of anything said... in the course of the mediation is not admissible in evidence, and disclosure of
any such evidence shall not be compelled, in any civil action...").
130. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3(3) rep. note cmt. d (Am. Law Inst.
Preliminary Draft No. 12, 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT DRAFT 12].
131. For the question of whether there is a duty to be candid and reveal adverse authority in the mediation
context, see text accompanying note 54. One wonders when an ADR session can be considered a tribunal.
132. At a recent conference sponsored by Forbes and the AAA, the ADR Superconference, April 28-29, 1997
in Washington, D.C., mediator-lawyers differed as to whether they would report such violations to the
appropriate disciplinary bodies. As one lawyer said, it would have a chilling effect on mediation if lawyers
thought they could be reported by the mediator. However it might also have a chilling effect on unethical
conduct if lawyers knew that they could be reported. Of course, there is always the possibility that unethical
lawyers could choose non-lawyer mediators who have no duty to report them. This paradox is a major concern
of lawyer-mediators who fear that too much regulation of lawyer-mediators qua lawyers will disadvantage them
vis-A-vis other professionals practicing mediation. What is difficult to understand in this debate is why
lawyer-mediators do not believe that they would be advantaged in the market place if consumers knew they had
a strictly enforced code to monitor ethics and standards of practice.
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ers might consider how to resolve the difficult confidentiality issues presented
here. For what it is worth, my own view of the subject is that lawyer misconduct
can and should be reported unless the only way to do so is to reveal information
that would otherwise be protected by lawyer-client confidentiality protections or
if such disclosures would unnecessarily harm the client, in which cases the
disclosure should be excused. These situations provide challenges for drafting
black letter rules (though illustrations may be easier here133).
In the mediation context, as in the adversary representation context, there are
exceptions to the protection of confidentiality. Just as the current version of
section 117A allows disclosure of client confidential information to prevent
death, serious bodily injury, or substantial financial loss, many state mediation
statutes require mediators to disclose party (and therefore lawyer) information
when other statutes or policies require it.1 34 If the very protected information of
client confidences is now subject to exceptions for the prevention, and in some
cases rectification, of certain crimes and fraud, an analogous reading of media-
tion confidentiality where the mediator is a lawyer1 35 may need an explicit
reference. In the mediation context, where, under a Tarasoff-like136 claim, parties
may allege that mediators had knowledge of information that could have
prevented serious bodily harm, injury, or substantial economic loss, it would be
especially useful to clarify the lawyer-mediator's responsibilities. In mediation
there are many contexts in which such information might become known. In
family mediation, for example, mediators often become aware of likely serious
bodily harm against partners and children in the domestic context. 137 Mediators
133. On the delicate relation between black letter and illustrations in the Restatement, see Thomas Morgan,
Conflicts of Interest in the Restatement: Comments on Professor Nancy Moore's Paper, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 1 (1997).
134. See Draft Ethical Standards for Neutrals Providing ADR Services to State Trial Courts in Massachusetts
§ llI(G)(3)(a) (1995) [hereinafter Draft Ethical Standards] (exempting a neutral from the duty to maintain
confidentiality in the case where he or she has "reasonable cause to believe that a minor or other person who the
neutral believes is incapable of protecting his/her interests has been subjected to abuse or neglect, or is at
substantial risk of such abuse or neglect in the future..."), reprinted in E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN
K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BusINESs 1199 (1996).
135. As some of the state statutory exceptions to mediation confidentiality and case law make clear,
non-lawyer mediators could be subject to much stronger and broader disclosure requirements than lawyers. See
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d. 334 (Cal. 1976) (holding that relationship of psychothera-
pist to either the patient, who confided his intention to kill another, or to the intended victim was sufficient to
establish a duty of care that required the therapist to warn the intended victim or take other proper actions). This
difference once again raises the question of whether lawyer-mediators can be held to different standards than
mediators generally.
136. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d. at 334.
137. This is one reason why some feminists deplore the use of mediation in divorce and domestic abuse
cases, both because such information should not be privatized, in their view, and also because of the absence of
appropriate sanctions in that context. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse
Impact on Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv. WoMEN's. L.J. 57, 61 (1984) (arguing that
"mediation in abuse cases is based on misconceptions about the nature of wife abuse, and that [it] not only fails
to protect women from subsequent violence, but also perpetuates their continued victimization"); Laurie
Woods, Mediation: a Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431 (1985)
1997]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
in commercial, business, and tort matters often learn of confidential financial
information that may reveal serious economic fraud, demonstrating that all of the
concerns about economic fraud in the traditional lawyer-client relationship,
38
have now reared their ugly heads in the mediation context.1 39 The Restatement
may take the position that mediation is "outside the scope" of its purview, but
lawyer-mediators will need guidance on these issues.
7. Client Representation and Counseling
To the extent that the crux of my argument here is the absence of any
recognition by the Restatement of the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral, there
is a smaller, ancillary, but easier-to-fix silence on the role or duty of the
representative-advocate lawyer to advise clients of means other than litigation to
resolve disputes and settle transactions. To the extent that section 151 recognizes
the significance of substantive "non-legal aspects of a proposed course of
conduct," it is indeed strange not to acknowledge the counseling function of a
lawyer to advise his or her client about "non-legal" (or at least, less legal or less
formal) means for dealing with legal problems, the very thing that lawyers are
most expert about advising. Virtually all of Chapter Seven 140 presumes - and
indeed, the introductory note explicitly provides - that "advocacy is the most
familiar and the most ancient of lawyers' roles," 14  as if advocacy within
litigation was the only or major lawyer role. This description is woefully
under-inclusive for several reasons, and here the Restatement bears a remarkable
resemblance to older conceptions of lawyering that informed both the Model
Code and the Model Rules.
First, even if advocacy were the lawyer's only or major role, that advocacy
itself is now performed in a number of locations beyond or before the courthouse.
(claiming that the trend toward mediation to resolve family law disputes threatens to erode the legal protections
that women have gained in recent years).
138. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271 (1984) (exploring the problem of client fraud in transactional
representation and concluding that the Model Rules, although reasonably workable, are inadequate according to
moral and legal principles with respect to this problem); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud:
They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETrmcs 701 (1993) (arguing that the lawyers promulgating the Model
Rules are primarily concerned with maintaining their own understanding of what a lawyer's responsibilities are,
no matter what the courts say they are, and do not really know what they are doing when they attempt to make
rules regarding client fraud).
139. Among mediators, one of the most often discussed ethical dilemmas is whether a mediator who learns
of the impending or very likely financial insolvency of one party to a mediation has any duty to reveal, or
compel the party to reveal, that information to the other party. Other typical dilemmas include the reverse
situation, where misrepresentations of economic security are made to try to secure or assure financing for a
settlement that the mediator may be quite certain is likely to fail.
140. RESTATEMENT DRAFTr 8 Ch. 7 ("Representing Clients in Litigation").
141. Id. Ch. 7, Introductory Note.
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The lawyer in negotiation, in settlement discussions, in mediation, in arbitration,
and increasingly in court-annexed programs, is asked to be an advocate in a
number of different venues. The question remains under the Restatement whether
the lawyer's duties and responsibilities as an advocate are the same or should be
the same in all of these locales.' 42 To the extent that section 165 recognizes that
lawyers must comply with applicable law, including rules of procedure and
evidence, the Restatement, whether wittingly or not, incorporates compliance
with the now wide-ranging requirements of lawyers to participate in ADR
proceedings of various kinds. 
14 3
More important than the noted specific absences or silences of the Restatement
on particular issues of relevance to the stated black letter and commentary on the
rules, is the general silence or absence of recognition of the role of the lawyer as
problem-solver, facilitator of human relations, and healer of disputes who may,
either through advocacy roles within different kinds of proceedings, or through
new roles, such as third-party neutral dispute or transaction facilitators, 44 deal
with human legal problems in ways other than adversarial advocacy or represen-
tational and thus "aligned" counseling. 145 To the extent that such work is going
on daily in law offices, courthouses, businesses, hospitals, schools, and other
institutions in our society, I would prefer that the Restatement acknowledge these
"legal practices" and at the same time, consider what, if any, regulation or
restatement of principles might be necessary to insure that lawyers, when
performing these roles, do so in the best possible way, without harm to the parties
and to others affected by legal disputes or transactions. 1
46
So, if the Restatement is silent, what do I suggest it should say?
142. For a discussion of whether ADR proceedings qualify as "tribunals" for purposes of calling up the
appropriate duty of candor, see supra text accompanying note 54. Under the definitions provided in the current
draft of the Restatement, a tribunal includes any body "hearing a contested matter under rules of procedure or
evidence," such as "contested arbitration and similar trial-type proceedings," but does not include "a mediation
(except mediation in the form of mock trial or similar contested proceeding)." RESTATEMENT DRAFr 8 Ch.7,
Introductory Note. One wonders whether an evaluative mediation with party presentations would qualify as a
"mediation in the form of a mock trial or similar contested proceeding."
143. Indeed, many courts not only have promulgated their own local rules governing the procedures of ADR,
but they also have issued ethics rules for practice in ADR programs. PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 79, at
59-307. There also have been some case law rulings that bear upon lawyers' duties in such proceedings. See,
e.g., GTE Directories Serv. Corp. v. Pacific Bell Directory, 135 F.R.D. 187, 192-93 (1991) (supporting a narrow
construction of waiver of attorney-client privilege in early neutral evaluation cases in order to encourage
litigants and lawyers to err on the side of production when confronted with discovery requests).
144. For one of the earliest attempts to specify some ethical standards for these new roles, see Leonard L.
Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1984).
145. For a recent description of how lawyers need to broaden their conception of roles to fit modern
organizational needs, see Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations
About Women, the Academy and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 (1996).
146. For one study of actual ethical dilemmas in third-party practice, see Robert A. Baruch Bush, Ethical
Dilemmas, in GoLMkN, supra note 12, at 385-437.
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III. THE POSSIBLE ARCHITECTURE OF SOME RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS ENGAGED IN ADR: THE LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY
NEUTRAL OR PROBLEM SOLVER (OF NON- OR LESS ADVERSARIAL LAWYERING)
In my present capacity as Chair of the CPR-Georgetown Commission on
Ethics and Standards in ADR, I have labored to consider some of these issues, as
well as others I have not thus far mentioned here, such as what standards, ethics,
and responsibilities should govern organizational providers of dispute resolution
services 14 7 and whether lawyer-mediators ought to be accountable in some way
for the outcomes or agreements over which they preside.' 48 These are difficult
and perhaps unmanageable issues; 14 9 or perhaps it is still too early to attempt
regulation of these new practices, especially in a field that seeks to be trans-
disciplinary and include non-lawyers and one that seeks to preserve, above all
else, flexibility and creativity in problem-solving. Nevertheless, I think it is
important for a document as important as the Restatement to acknowledge the
important other roles of lawyers and perhaps to see, as I do, that our move from
trial by combat to trial by adversarial words may be giving way to new practices,
roles, and institutions that also need some clarification and some standards. To
that end, I will conclude here by sketching out what such a restatement or series
of rules might provide. Where I can I will state my own views, 1 50 but I will also
147. For an interesting analogy here, see Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline For Law Firms?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991) in which proposals for law firm responsibility and discipline are set forth that include
recognition of corporate criminal liability on top of regulation of law practice through the disciplinary process.
148. Compare Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV.
1 (1981) (asserting that mediators of environmental disputes should be held accountable for mediated
outcomes) with Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT.
L. REV. 85, 86 (1981) (arguing that Susskind's demand for non-neutral mediators is "conceptually and
pragmatically incompatible with the goals and purposes of mediation" and that "[i]t is precisely a mediator's
commitment to neutrality which ensures responsible actions on the part of the mediator...").
149. Massachusetts has attempted to regulate such issues. See Draft Ethical Standards, supra note 134, at
§ III(E) ("Responsibility to Non-Participating Parties: A neutral should consider, and where appropriate,
encourage the parties to consider, the interests of persons affected by actual or potential agreements and not
participating or represented in the process").
150. In my first review of the professional responsibility issues for third-party neutrals, I somewhat naively
suggested there were some core issues that were likely to be dealt with by a consensus in the profession. See
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-party Neutrals, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF
Lrmo., Sept. 1993, at 129, 130 (labeling as "non-controversial" such ethical issues as informed consent by the
parties about type of process to be used, conflicts of interests and subsequent disqualification in same matter,
prohibitions on contingency fees, and prohibitions on social, financial, or legal interests in dispute or with
parties or counsel to disputes mediated or arbitrated). Other issues that I labeled as more controversial included
accountability of third-party neutrals for the outcomes they reach, responsibility for balancing unequal power or
resources of the parties, and the ethics of various different ADR practices. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte
Talks with Neutrals: ADR Hazards, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG., Sept. 1994, at 109 (1994)
(discussing the ethical hazards of private caucuses, evaluative versus facilitating mediation, and ex parte
communications with parties); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private Settlements: Conflicting Legal
Policies, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LING., June 1993, at 85 (discussing the public policy implications of
secrecy and confidentiality in some mediated settlements). Very soon after I offered this simple division of
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present choices that are currently available for dealing with some of the more
difficult issues. The major difficulty with such an attempt to specify standards for
lawyers in the use of ADR is that ADR practice can easily be assimilated to,
absorbed by, and analogized to conventional lawyer practices and behaviors,151
while at the same time it wants to be different from such conventional practices,
offering other repertoires of behavior and human problem-solving. Thus, there is
an inevitable tension in attempting to cabin, by regulation and restatement, what
is still a creative and fledgling enterprise. At the same time, with potential and
actual abuses being reported each day and a growing number of legal challenges
to various practices within the field, I think it timely and worthwhile to attempt to
state some standards that should govern our profession when it engages in this
work. Though the Reporters of the Restatement may demur by claiming that it is
too early to attempt a "restatement" without more of those legal challenges and
cases already decided, it is significant to note here that many states 152 and several
federal courts have already drafted, and in some cases fully adopted, ethical rules,
standards, and regulations with respect to the various practices that are included
under the ADR umbrella.
Drafting choices for the Restatement include: 1) modification of existing
sections; 2) use of illustrations, comments, and reporter's notes to demonstrate
where ADR practices may be analogized to already existing legal and ethical
standards and to report on modifications or exceptions to those sections by
currently existing relevant case law; or 3) drafting of a separate chapter or topic,
to formally recognize these practices of lawyers. 153
The CPR-Georgetown Commission1 54 has begun drafting some proposed
rules for possible adoption in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.155
issues, it became clear to me that all were controversial. The area of conflicts of interests has emerged as the
major contentious issue among would-be regulators. See supra text accompanying notes 55-83 for further
discussion of conflicts. It has also become clear that some mediators do take stakes or contingent fees in the
settlements they broker, particularly in the mass tort context. Kenneth Feinberg, Speech delivered at the
Forbes-AAA Superconference, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 29, 1997).
151. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted or The Law of ADR, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991) (arguing that ADR already has been co-opted by
the adversary system).
152. See ETHICS COMISSION, CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, SELECTED READINGS ON ADR ETHICS
13-23, 47-62 (1996) (compiling rules from various states).
153. In the last year I have noted the presence of ADR practitioners and issues at virtually all meetings of
lawyers, including the ABA, the Litigation Section of the ABA, the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the
Association of American Corporate Counsel. The Restatement ignores this important subject of practice and
concern to all practicing lawyers at the risk of becoming outmoded and inadequate from the moment of its
adoption.
154. This commission is funded, in part, by the Hewlett Foundation. This is my disclosure.
155. There have been several earlier efforts and suggestions for rules in the ADR area to be added to the
Model Rules. See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case For Mediator Accountabil-
ity, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991) (arguing for the adoption of a proposed Model Rule 2.4, stating general
standards for mediation by lawyers and suggesting a higher standard of accountability when the parties are not
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1156 offerhere a possible framework or architecture of some rules for consider-
ation by the Reporters for possible adoption as sections in the current Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers:
A. PROPOSED CHAPTER SEVEN A OR (NEW) CHAPTER NINE: 1 5 7 THE LAWYER
AS NEUTRAL
15 8
Introductory Note: This topic deals with the role of a lawyer, acting in a
non-representational capacity, such as mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, or evalua-
tor, who may act to assist parties, which may include clients represented by
lawyers and parties who do not have legal representation, in resolving their
disputes or arranging their transactions with each other. In such situations,
lawyers, acting in non-representative capacities, may have different duties and
obligations than those of lawyers acting in a representative capacity. This chapter
recognizes that it is an important function of the lawyer to use the best means
possible to assist the client in achieving the client's lawful objectives. Included in
such service is the means employed to achieve the client's objectives. In many
separately represented). Our latest efforts reflect, for some of us, the inadequacies of current formulations in the
attempt at trans-disciplinary ethical code drafting in the JOINT STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 13,
adopted by the Section of Dispute Resolution, but not by the whole ABA, in 1994. Several of the members of the
Commission have served in these earlier drafting efforts.
156. I will indicate which views are those of the committee in its current deliberations and which are my
own. The small sub-committee of the Commission that is currently actively drafting rules is the Conflicts
sub-committee of the Working Group on Mediation as the Practice of Law. Sub-committee members include the
Honorable Jerome Simandle, The Honorable Edmund Spaeth, John Bickerman, Esq., Lawrence Fox, Esq.,
Duane Krohnke, Esq., Bruce Meyerson, Esq., Professor Nancy Rogers, Michael Young, Esq., Elizabeth
Plapinger, CPR, and myself. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., has served as a consultant and commentator for
the group.
157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Ch. 9 (Am. Law Inst. Preliminary Draft
No. 13, 1997), for proposed Chapter Nine ("Delivery of Legal Services"). If this proposal is drafted, this topic
could be included therein or become Chapter Nine with the proposed Chapter Nine becoming Chapter Ten. I
leave all of these choices to the Reporters and the Advisers to consider.
158. This rule attempts to regulate solely the ethical responsibilities of lawyers serving as neutrals, and does
not deal with other issues I have raised here, such as the potentially different duties of lawyers within ADR
settings, including mediation or early neutral evaluation. These points can be dealt with either by comments or
illustrations in the present text of Chapters Six and Seven, dealing with representation of clients. However, I
would not fault the Reporters for not confronting these issues yet, as here I think there probably is inadequate
law to derive the content of such duties. I simply appeal to the more aspirational aspects of the profession and
the educative function of the Restatement to remind lawyers of Lincoln's, and his more modem counterparts',
exhortations to- consider the lawyer's role as "peacemaker," which may require different behaviors within
representation, counseling, and litigation. I want to distinguish here the argument for the lawyer's role as
problem-solver and peacemaker from general desires for more regulation and better behavior for the "civility"
problem. See, e.g., Marvin E. Aspen, Professionalism in the Practice of Law: A Symposium on Civility and
Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 513 (1994)
(reviewing recent developments in the practice of law that threaten the civil and orderly function of the legal
profession). For more on this subject, see D.C. BAR Assoc. STANDARDS FOR CIVILITY IN PROFESS. CONDUCT, as
amended, March 11, 1997.
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cases, clients may choose means that seek to cause the least harm to all
participants in a dispute or transaction, that are least costly or time consuming,
that offer the promise of solving the problem in ways that might not be possible
through litigation and court orders, or that attend to non-legal interests such as
business, personal, social, moral, religious, or other concerns. Lawyers acting in
a representative or adviser capacity should advise their clients of the availability
of processes that may be designed to accomplish these ends.159 This chapter is
intended to be applied to the duties and responsibilities of lawyers who act as
third-party neutrals in the following processes:
160
ADJUDICATIVE
Arbitration - A forum in which each party (and its counsel) presents its
position and evidence before a neutral third-party, or a panel of arbitrators, some
of whom may have been chosen by the parties (and may therefore be "partisan"
arbitrators) who render(s) a specific award. If the parties agree in advance, or any
applicable statute provides, the award is binding and is enforceable in the same
manner as any contractual obligation or under the applicable statute (such as the
Federal Arbitration Act or state equivalents). Applicable statutes or agreements
by the parties may provide rules for whether the award must be in writing and
what recourse the parties may have when the arbitration is not binding.
EVALUATIVE
Neutral Evaluation - A forum in which lawyers and/or parties present
summaries of the facts, evidence, and legal principles applicable to their cases to
a single neutral or a panel of neutral evaluators who provide(s) an assessment of
the strength, weaknesses, and potential value of the case to all sides. By
agreement of the parties or by applicable court rule, such evaluations are usually
non-binding and offered to facilitate settlement. By agreement of the parties or by
applicable court rule or practice, if the matter does not settle, the neutral evaluator
may also provide other services such as case planning guidance, other settlement
159. If the Reporters decide to accept any of the analysis and argument of this Article, they may want to add
this sentence as a requirement or comment to the duties of lawyers in representative and counseling capacities,
such as in section 151(3). See RESTATEMENT DRAFT 8 § 151(3) (stating that a lawyer may address non-legal
aspects of a proposed course of conduct when counseling a client).
160. Most of the text of these descriptions of ADR processes is derived from a variety of other sources. E.g.,
MINN. GEN. PRAc. R. 114.02 (1997) (defining various terms relating to ADR); The ABCs ofADR: A Dispute
Resolution Glossary, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG., Nov. 1996, at 147 (providing a glossary of ADR
terms with definitions derived from prior publications of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution); NATIONAL
ADR INSTITUTE FOR FEDERAL JUDGES, JUDGE'S DESKBOOK ON COURT ADR (1993). Many other definitional
sources are available, but these three are relatively succinct, clear, and up to date.
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assistance and discovery scheduling. By agreement of the parties, or by appli-
cable court rule, the neutral evaluator(s) may issue fact-finding, discovery, and
other reports or recommendations.
FACILITATIVE
Mediation - A forum in which a neutral third-party facilitates communication
and negotiation among the parties to seek resolution of issues between the
parties. Mediation is non-binding and does not, unless otherwise agreed to by the
parties, authorize the third-party neutral to evaluate, decide, or otherwise offer a
judgment on the issues between the parties. If the mediation concludes in an
agreement, that agreement, if it meets otherwise applicable law concerning the
enforceability of contracts, is as enforceable as a contractual agreement. Where
authorized by court rules and applicable law, mediation agreements achieved
during pending litigation may be entered as court judgments.
HYBRID PROCESSES
Mini-trial - A forum in which parties and their counsel present their matter,
which may include evidence, legal arguments, documents, and other summaries
of their case, before a neutral third-party and representatives of all parties for the
purpose of defining issues, pursuing settlement negotiations, or otherwise sharing
information. A neutral third-party, usually at the parties' request, may issue an
advisory opinion that is non-binding, unless the parties agree otherwise.
MED-ARB - A forum in which the parties initially seek mediation of their
dispute before a third-party neutral; if they reach impasse, the mediation may
convert into an arbitration in which the third-party neutral renders an award. This
process may also occur in reverse in which, during a contested arbitration
proceeding, the parties may agree to seek facilitation of a settlement (mediation)
from the third-party neutral. In some cases, these third-party neutral functions
may be divided between two separate individuals or panels of individuals.
OTHER - Parties by agreement, or pursuant to court rules and regulations, may
create and utilize other dispute resolution processes before third-party neutral(s)
in order to facilitate settlement, manage or plan discovery and other case issues,
seek fact-finding or conciliation services, improve communication, simplify or
settle parts of cases, or for other reasons. Such processes may be decisional
(adjudicative), facilitative, or a hybrid of the two, and they may be binding or
non-binding, as party agreements, court rules, or statutes provide.
Lawyers who provide neutral services as described above shall be subject to
the duties and obligations as specified below.
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PROPOSED SECTION 1:161 IMPARTIALITY
A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral should:
(1) Assure that the lawyer is impartial with respect to the issues and the parties
in the matter by:
(A) Disclosing to the parties all reasons why the lawyer might reasonably
not be perceived to be impartial. These reasons include: (i) any direct or
indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome, or with the parties,
their counsel, or witnesses in the proceeding; (ii) any existing or past
financial, business, professional, family, or social relationship with any of
the parties, their counsel, or witnesses; and (iii) any other source of bias or
prejudice concerning a person, institution, or issue that is likely to affect
impartiality or that might reasonably create, an appearance of partiality or
bias;
(B) Conducting a reasonable inquiry and effort to determine if any
interests or biases described in section (A) exist and maintaining a
continuing obligation to disclose any such interests or potential biases that
may arise during the proceedings;
(C) Declining to participate as a third-party neutral unless all parties
choose to retain the neutral, following all such disclosures, unless appli-
cable court rules require participation, after weighing the parties' objec-
tions. If all parties agree to proceed after being informed of these matters
or the court requires participation, following application of whatever
applicable rules the court imposes, the lawyer shall proceed as a neutral.
If, however, the lawyer believes that the matters disclosed would inhibit
the lawyer's impartiality, the lawyer should decline to proceed;
(D) Extending all disclosures of interests to those of the lawyer, members
of his or her family, and his or her current employer, partners, or business
associates;
(E) After accepting appointment and while serving as a neutral, refraining
from entering into any financial, business, professional, family, or social
relationship or acquiring any financial or personal interest that is likely to
affect impartiality or that might reasonably create the appearance of
partiality or bias, without disclosure and consent of all parties.
(2) Conduct all proceedings in an impartial and evenhanded manner, treating
all parties with fairness and respect and acting at all times without bias or
prejudice. If at any time the lawyer is unable to conduct the process in an
impartial manner, the lawyer shall withdraw, unless prohibited from doing so
by applicable law or court rules.
161. I have numbered the sections proposed in simple numerical order. When the final numbers are assigned
in the Restatement, these proposed sections, if adopted, would be renumbered depending on their placement.
Where possible, I have used language, definitions, standards, and formulations consistent with other sections of
the Restatement.
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(A) A lawyer serving in a third-party neutral capacity should not allow
other matters to interfere with the lawyer's impartiality.
(B) A lawyer serving in a third-party neutral capacity should conduct all
proceedings in a manner that promotes the integrity and impartiality of the
lawyer's role as neutral.
(C) When serving in an adjudicative capacity, the lawyer shall decide all
matters fairly, with impartiality, exercising independent judgment and
without any improper outside influence.
PROPOSED SECTION 2: COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
(1) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral should act diligently, efficiently,
and promptly, subject to the standard of care owed the parties as required by
applicable law and standards applied to third-party neutrals in similar circum-
stances, unless the lawyer represents, or applicable court rules require, that the
lawyer exercise greater competence or diligence.
(2) A lawyer should decline to serve in those matters in which the lawyer is not
competent to serve.
PROPOSED SECTION 3: CONFIDENTIALITY
(1) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall maintain confidentiality of
all information acquired in the context of serving as a third-party neutral by the
parties and their counsel, unless the third-party neutral is required or permitted
by law or agreement of the parties to disclose or use any otherwise confidential
information.
(A) As between the parties, the third-party neutral shall maintain in
confidence all information disclosed to the third-party neutral in confi-
dence from either side, unless a party agrees otherwise.
(B) A third-party neutral should discuss confidentiality rules and require-
ments with the parties at the beginning of any proceeding and obtain party
consent with respect to any ex parte communication or practice.
(C) A lawyer who has served as a third-party neutral shall not thereafter
use information acquired in the ADR proceeding to the disadvantage of
any party to the ADR proceeding, except when the information has
become publicly known or the parties have agreed otherwise.
(2)162 A third-party neutral may use or disclose confidential information
obtained during a proceeding when and to the extent the third-party believes
necessary to prevent:
162. This section is intended to track Restatement section 117A and is likely to lead to similar controversies
among third-party neutrals as among lawyers. However I believe, as I stated supra text accompanying note 134,
that third-party neutrals already are under an obligation to reveal such information under separate statutory
requirements or case law such as Tarasoff. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d. 334 (Cal.
1976) (placing an affirmative duty on psychologist to inform patient's intended victim of danger).
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(A) death or serious bodily injury from occurring as the result of a crime
that a party has committed or intends to commit; or
(B) substantial financial loss from occurring as the result of a crime or
fraud that the party has committed or intends to commit.
(3) Before using or disclosing information pursuant to section (2), if not
otherwise required to be disclosed, the third-party neutral must, if feasible,
make a good faith effort to persuade the party's counsel or the party, if the party
is unrepresented, either not to act, or to warn those who might be harmed by the
party's action.
PROPOSED SECTION 4: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST' 
63
(1) A lawyer who is serving as a third-party neutral shall not, during the course
of an ADR proceeding, seek to establish any financial, business, representa-
tional, neutral, or personal relationship with, or acquire an interest in, any party,
entity, or counsel who is involved in the matter in which the lawyer is
participating as a neutral.t64
(2) Individual Third-party Neutral Disqualifications
(A) Without disclosure and. consent by all the parties, a lawyer who has
served as a third-party neutral shall not subsequently represent any party
to the ADR proceeding (in which the third-party neutral served as neutral)
in the same or a substantially related matter.
(B) In addition, a lawyer who has served as a third-party neutral shall not
subsequently represent, in a substantially unrelated matter, for a reason-
able period of time under the circumstances, a party to the ADR proceed-
163. In this section I will offer some alternatives for different resolutions of some of the difficult issues
implicated in conflicts of interest in this area. One of the key issues here, as in all conflicts, is whether the rules
are directed at the parties' own concern about, and actual harm suffered from, conflicts which, can often be
consented to or dealt with by one set of rules, or whether the rules should be directed at broader concerns about
the appearance of propriety or impropriety to the more general public or possible consumers of lawyers'
services when certain changes of role occur. An example of such a change of role would be when a former
neutral, like the judge in Cho v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995), joins forces with an advocate
in the same or a substantially related case.
Individual harms may have to be considered separately from the "appearance" or "public" harms. The latter
can lead to more draconian disqualification and imputation rules that trouble today's more diverse - in terms of
practice roles - and mobile practitioners.
164. This section is intended to prevent a third-party neutral from using the ADR process to obtain additional
employment or a financial interest in achieving a particular result. Some third-party neutrals might argue for an
exception for the situation where there are "repeat" disputes or transactions, and one party, or even both parties,
might want to employ the neutral for many disputes. They also might argue for an exceptio.n where one party
decides during the course of a mediation that the mediator could handle other matters for the party. This section
is designed to bar the problem of repeat play business affecting the interests of the third-party neutral. As
expressed in the text, the current draft appears "non-consentable." Consent by all the parties could be required
as one way of at least ensuring that full knowledge of the mediator's possible interests will be imparted to the
"victims" of repeat play third-party neutrals - those who are usually one-shot disputants who do not know that
their mediator often works for the other side in other matters. Under the draft impartiality (and disclosure) rule
proposed here, section l(l)(A)(ii), such a "one-shot" party would be informed of the mediator's past, present,
and continuing relationship with the other party in other matters.
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ing where the circumstances might reasonably create the appearance that
the neutral had been influenced in the ADR process by the anticipation or
expectation of a subsequent relationship or interest.t
65
(3) Imputation of Conflicts to Affiliated Lawyers and Removing Imputation
(A) Unless all affected parties consent after disclosure, in any matter
where a lawyer would be disqualified under section (2), the restrictions
imposed therein also restrict all other lawyers who are affiliated with that
lawyer under section 203.166
An alternative to this section, which would permit screening in this context and
which accepts the arguments of some 1 6 7 that third-party neutrals, when they
promise confidentiality, cannot share information with even their law partners
and thus are particularly well suited for screening, would provide:
(3) (alternative) If a lawyer is disqualified by section (2), no lawyer who is
affiliated with that lawyer may knowingly undertake or continue representation
in any substantially related or unrelated matter 168 unless the personally
prohibited lawyer is adequately screened from any participation in the matter, is
apportioned no fee from the matter, and timely and adequate notice of the
screening has been provided to all affected parties and tribunals, pursuant to the
requirements of [proposed] section 204, provided that no material confidential
information about any of the parties to the ADR proceeding has been communi-
cated by the personally prohibited lawyer to the affiliated lawyer or that
lawyer's firm. 1
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165. The purpose of this section is to prevent the third-party neutral from having an interest in the outcome of
a mediation turn on the possibility of future business with a party who would be satisfied by the outcome. The
language is derived from the ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DispuTEs, supra note 13. Some have argued for a
presumptive period of disqualification, such as one year, that would allow representation in substantially
unrelated matters after that time period. Because the Restatement prefers general, not time-based, rules, I have
not suggested such a time period here, though such a provision might be added to any such similar provision in
another ethics code, such as a proposed new Model Rule for Third-party Neutrals.
166. This is the equivalent of the current imputation rule under Model Rule 1.10, yet it also applies the
non-screen, imputation rulings of Cho v. Superior Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995), and Poly Software
Int'l, Inc. v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995).
167. Maguire, supra note 64, at 4.
168. This formulation continues to impute disqualification to the whole firm for the same matter, but allows
screens for substantially related matters, and unrelated matters not governed by section 2(B).
169. In the event this formulation were to be adopted, it should explicitly cross-reference section 3(C),
prohibiting the use of any confidential information learned during an ADR process. Yet another possible
formulation would provide for no imputation to affiliated lawyers at all, and thus allow subsequent representa-
tion in substantially related matters if there has been no caucusing (or separately learned information) in the
ADR process. The rationale here is that if both parties are present in the ADR process, they both know what the
third-party neutral knows and there is no inter-party confidentiality, and therefore, no assumed proprietary or
secret information that could be used in a subsequent representation. This approach makes the conflicts issue
turn on the specifics of the conduct of particular ADR sessions and is likely to be too specific for Restatement
purposes. It also fails to deal with the important concern that, even if the parties are not harmed in any way, it
looks bad to the public when the same law firm employing a third-party neutral who sought to promote
settlement in a particular case, later acts as the advocate for one of those parties. This is the same concern that
the court expressed in Cho, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870.
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(4) A lawyer selected as a partisan arbitrator of a party in a multi-member
arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party,
nor are any affiliated lawyers.
PROPOSED SECTION 5: FEES
(1) Before or within a reasonable time after being retained as a third-party
neutral, a lawyer should communicate to the parties, in writing, the basis or rate
and allocation of the fee for service, unless the third-party neutral is serving in a
no-fee or pro bono capacity.
(2) A third-party neutral who withdraws from a case should return any
unearned fee to the parties.
(3) A third-party neutral who charges a fee contingent on the settlement or
other specific resolution of the matter should explain to the parties that such an
arrangement gives the third-party neutral a direct financial interest in settlement
that may conflict with the parties' possible interest in terminating the proceed-
ings without reaching settlement. The third-party neutral should consider
whether such a fee arrangement creates an appearance or actuality of partiality,
inconsistent with the requirements of [proposed] section one.17
0
PROPOSED SECTION 6: FAIRNESS AND INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS
17 1
(1) The lawyer serving as neutral should ensure that the ADR proceedings
utilized should be clearly explained to, and understood by, the parties and their
counsel and that where appropriate, the parties should knowingly consent to the
process being used (unless applicable law or court rules require use of a
particular process).
(2) The third-party neutral should not engage in any process or procedure not
consented to by the parties (unless required by applicable law or court rule).1
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170. The preferred ethical standard in most existing codes is to prohibit contingent fees in the mediation and
arbitration area. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DIsPUrES Standard I § F (Am. Bar
Ass'n 1984). That would be a viable alternative here. The current formulation is drafted to reflect known actual
practices of very successful mediators who charge contingent fees as an "incentive" to cooperate in settlement
and ADR proceedings. The proposed standard would simply require attention to be paid to possible conflicts and
to disclose to the parties.
171. I offer this section because it is important and because most existing ethical codes for mediators and
third-party neutrals have an equivalent section. I expect this section will not be popular with the Reporters
because of the vagueness of the terms used and the fact that it expresses a concern about a particular process,
instead of imposing duties on a particular lawyer. See Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Trustee Professor of
Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Director, American Law Institute, to Elizabeth Plapinger, Vice
President and Director, Judicial Project and Ethics Commission, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 3 (Apr. 2,
1997) (on file with the author) (expressing concern that "[o]ne should be wary of rules cast in terms of quality of
process..."). However I urge them to consider this section anyway.
172. In commentary that should accompany such a rule, it should be made clear that what is intended here is
to provide the parties to an ADR session with choices. Such choices would include whether mediation is to be
facilitative or evaluative, whether caucuses are to be used or not, and what processes the parties want to use in
the first place. This may not be possible in situations where processes are mandated, either by contract (through
6671997]
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(3) The third-party neutral should insure that the process is conducted with
fairness for all parties and should accord every person who has a legal interest a
right to be heard. 17 3 The third-party neutral should be especially diligent to
ensure that parties who are not represented have adequate opportunities to be
heard and involved in any ADR proceedings. 
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(4) Where a settlement or agreement is reached in an ADR proceeding, the
third-party neutral should assure that the parties have reached agreement of
their own volition and knowingly consent to any settlement. A third-party
neutral should not preside over a coerced, non-voluntary agreement. A third-
party neutral cannot personally ensure that each party has made a fully
informed choice to reach a particular agreement, but a third-party neutral
should make unrepresented parties aware of the importance of consulting with
professionals, where appropriate, to help them make informed decisions.1
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IV. CONCLUSION
Should these or some amended version of these suggested black letter
formulations find support among the Reporters, Advisers, or Members of the
American Law Institute, commentary, illustrations, and notes would need to be
supplied. I am postponing (would some say "punting or shirking?") such
additional drafting at the present time because of my expectation (fear? cyni-
cism? concern?) that the whole subject of the lawyer as neutral, the lawyer-
counselor's role as adviser about ADR, and the representative-lawyer's changing
adhesion or unrestricted negotiation) or by court rules and requirements. The questions implicated in the
fairness and integrity of the process are very controversial at the present time. Legal challenges to court-
mandated programs and contractual compulsory arbitration clauses demonstrate this problem. See, e.g.,
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that the application of local experimental
court rule providing for compulsory non-binding arbitration as a prerequisite to jury trial in certain civil suits for
recovery of money damages of $50,000 or less does not violate right to trial by jury guaranteed by Seventh
Amendment, equal protection clause, or any federal statutes or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, Inc.,.938 P.2d 903, 908 (Cal. 1997) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence
to support trial court's finding that operators of health care plan engaged in fraudulent conduct justifying a
denial of their petition to enforce mandatory arbitration clause in subscriber contract). Thus the Reporters might
conclude that such a matter is too "substantive" or too unsettled for this Restatement. The question of whether
there should be separate rules for voluntary and mandatory ADR roles, whether contractual or court-annexed,
remains an open one that I do not attempt to address in these proposals.
173. This language is taken from the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3 § 7 (1990).
174. The question of what ethical or other obligations third-party neutrals have to unrepresented parties
remains a controversial one and is not "legislated" here. Some think that ADR is never appropriate when one
party is unrepresented or there are serious power imbalances between the parties. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1609 (1991) (arguing that California's
"legislative choice to make mediation mandatory [in child custody disputes] has been a mistake" because it is
even more disempowering to women than the adversary system).
175. This formulation is derived from MINN. GEN. PRAc. R. 114. The purpose behind such rules is to provide
some guidelines and standards of behavior that will inspire public confidence in the integrity of ADR processes
and the third-party neutral's role in ensuring these values are realized, especially when some parties are
unrepresented.
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role as an "advocate" in ADR is too unfamiliar, too new, too unconventional, or
too vague to receive serious consideration for this version of the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers.
Yet one last time, let me close by suggesting that the Restatement ignores these
subjects at its peril. The phenomenal growth of ADR activity among lawyers 76
makes it clear that Appropriate/Alternative Dispute Resolution is here to stay, and
its practice by lawyers implicates many ethical and legal duties and responsibili-
ties. I would prefer to see a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers that
recognized this most satisfying and important role of lawyers - to discourage
litigation (or to resolve it) where possible, to help people keep the peace when
adversarial battle is not necessary or desirable, and to remind both lawyers and
the consumers of their services that lawyers can productively solve problems.
Whether as an educative tool for lawyers, judges, law students, or clients, or as a
guide for deciding difficult ethical questions, it seems to me the Restatement must
say something about the less adversarial role of lawyers. Those roles are currently
being practiced, and if the Restatement remains silent, it will be outmoded from
the moment it is finally enacted.
176. At the time of this writing, an ADR Superconference, sponsored by the AAA and Forbes, brought
hundreds of business lawyers to Washington, D.C., to discuss the uses and strategies of the ADR process in
banking, mass torts, construction, employment, commercial, securities, lawyer-lawyer, and other kinds of
disputes and transactions. The Supreme Court continues to sustain contractual and statutory arbitration every
year against a multiplicity of legal challenges. See, e.g., Doctors Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652,
1656-57 (1996) (holding that courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only
to arbitration provisions because Congress preempted such laws when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act);
Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (holding that the language of the Federal
Arbitration Act precludes states from enforcing anti-arbitration laws that strike arbitration clauses from
contracts with basic terms that otherwise would be deemed fair). Many believe that mediation is fast
outstripping arbitration as the ADR method of choice, as it provides greater control over process, choice of
decision maker, and flexibility of outcome.
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